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<br />CENTRAL UTAH PROJECT COMPLETION ACT
<br />
<br />165
<br />
<br />Dispute resolution theory provides a simple but useful metaphor
<br />that helps explain the baniers to water markets and to water reform,
<br />The Bureau of Reclamation and local water conservancy districts,
<br />institutions dominant in the existing state of water law and policy, will
<br />lose their power if market forces control water policy and resource
<br />allocation. Their interests, therefore, lie in protecting the status quo.
<br />Fanners also want to protect the status quo, but they are driven by the
<br />perception that water markets will lead to widespread disruption of
<br />agricultural communities. These barriers of interest and perception are
<br />discussed below. Since the proponents of water reform have generally
<br />been unable to change the interests and the perceptions of their
<br />adversaries, they can only try to force change through the political
<br />process. So far, efforts to unilaterally reform the system have been
<br />ineffective."
<br />
<br />A Institutional Barriers
<br />
<br />1. The Bureau of Reclamation
<br />
<br />Since 1902 the Bureau has been instrumental in the economic
<br />development of the West,'" Spurred by New Deal era programs" the
<br />agency became a political machine, the third leg of an iron triangle
<br />formed by western congressionalleacIers, agriculture, and public power
<br />interests."' At the height of its popularity, the Bureau engineered and
<br />built the Hoover, Bonneville, Glen Canyon, and Grand CouIlee
<br />
<br />potential for all partiN to achieve an advantageous solution. Increasingly, this field hu
<br />benefitted from the interdileiplinery study of game theory, economics, psychology, and
<br />behavioral leienee. 8ft ..nerally I3A1uuERs TO TIlE NEGOTIATED REsoLtmON OF CONFLICT
<br />(Kenneth Arrow et aI. eds., 1993). '
<br />.. 8ft, o.lf., infra now 12~143 and accompanying text,
<br />· A. oet forth in the Raclamation Act of 1902, the Bureau operated in 16 states: Arizona,
<br />California, Colorado. Idaho, Kansa.s, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada. New Mexico, North Dakota,
<br />Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. Reclamation Act of 1902,
<br />Pub, L. No. 57-161, 32 Stet. 388, 388. Oongre.. later extended the Bureau's jurisdiction 10
<br />include Texaa (Act of June 12, 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-226, 34 Stat, 259, 259) and Hawaii (Act of
<br />July 15, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-188, 69 Stat. 354, 357). The current Reclamation Act is codified
<br />at 43 U.S.C. tt 371-$Oa (1988).
<br />· Between 1935 and 1937 00_ authorized $800 million for Bureau water projects.
<br />Alfred G. CuzUi, ApproprW.wra Vora... ExproprW.wra: TIu. Political Economy of Water in tlu.
<br />Woot, in WATER RIGHTS: SCARCE REsoVllCEAu.ocATlON, BUllEAUCRACY, AND TIlE ENVrRONMENT
<br />13, 35 (Terry L. Andenon ed., 1988).
<br />.. Id. at 29-37; _ ..nerally MARc ilEIsNER, CADILLAC DESERT (1988) (describing the hislory
<br />and development of the Bureau and its influence on the West).
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