|
<br />1'-
<br />0:::'
<br />
<br />,-. ,
<br />.. ,
<br />N
<br />
<br />c.
<br />
<br />F,;
<br />tl~
<br />
<br />l'/:.l
<br />
<br />iLl. J::IJ,.,,I:,,J."~.&.t .a.~",,,,,,. ---- -
<br />
<br />are unwilling to accept responsibility for many of the West's water
<br />problems." Finally, the Bureau and its beneficiaries have strong
<br />political allies in Congress, who have been able to resist most changes
<br />to the bureaucracy.65 Even critics like Marc Reisner believe the
<br />Bureau should not be abolished, because dismantling the Bureau would
<br />create additional administrative difficulties and costly political
<br />battles."
<br />
<br />2. Water Conservancy Districts
<br />
<br />Water delivery in the West is controlled by a complex, overlapping
<br />system of water institutions..7 Consumers receive water from various
<br />retailing institutions,.. which in turn obtain their supplies from
<br />various wholesaling institutions, usually the Bureau, Retailing
<br />institutions come in a myriad of forms. Two principal types are mutual
<br />
<br />Some have even argued that the obatecle. to Cederel weter merkele ere not legel barriers but
<br />aclminiltrative barriers caused. by the Bureau. WAHL, 8upra note 4, at 148 (-It is sometim81
<br />preeumed that there ere gonerel tegel prohibitions ageinst the resale oC weter by Ceders!
<br />contractors. However, thY presumption appears to derive Crom administrative practice rather
<br />than specific lepl mendateo.").
<br />.. A Natural Resources DeCense Council report Cound that the Centrel Velley Project
<br />beneficiaries have received a subsidy worth $1.5 billion. The Bureau did not deny the subsidy
<br />but responded, '"Of' course thil is what haa been going aD. But it isn't really our fault..
<br />REISNER, supra note 27, at 502.
<br />II Willey & Graff, .upro note 61, at 363, stating:
<br />Reforms which would make new government-backed and subsidized projects
<br />toos likely and which would...... thosa agencioo with liability Cor the resource
<br />damagea they cause threaten bureaucrats whose careers are dependent on 8uch
<br />projecta. These agencies have allies in Congress and in the private sector who do
<br />not pay the full price Cor the benefile which the projecle deliver.
<br />These potential opponents in the private sector have been able to exploit
<br />public water reoourceo at little or no coot to themselvoo and might, under the
<br />proposed reCorms, find themselves liable Cor pollution they ere causing or find their
<br />expectations of further government subsidies frustrated. tntimately some private
<br />political opposition is ineviteble, but a .ignificant pert oC this potential opposition
<br />can be avoided by making the reallocation of water supplies voluntary and by
<br />encouraging least cost pollution control through incentive mechanisDll.
<br />.. REIsNER " BATES. supra note 10, at 63.
<br />IT See Barton H. Thompson, IMtitutional Perspectives on Water Policy and Markets, 81 CAL-
<br />L. REV. (Corthcominc May 1993).
<br />. Utah, Cor example, hoo water conservancy elistrieta, UTAH CoDE ANN. n 17A-2.14011o-
<br />1454 (1991). metropolitan water elistrieta, UTAH CODE ANN. n 17A-2-B01 to -861 (1991 & Supp.
<br />1992), county improvement diotricte. UTAH CoDE ANN. n 17A-2-301 to .338 (1991 & Supp,
<br />1992), county service areas, UTAH CoDE ANN. n 17A-2-401 to -431 (1991), and irrigstion
<br />diotrieta, UTAH CoDE ANN. n 17A-2-701 to -768 (1991).
<br />
<br />-f
<br />
<br />
|