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<br />~ <br />~ <br /><:'.1 <br />N <br /> <br />~) <br /> <br />c.. <br /> <br />''j; <br />; <br />, <br /> <br />" <br /> <br />":. <br /> <br /> <br />1993] <br /> <br />CENTRAL UTAH PROJECT COMPLETION ACT <br /> <br />171 <br /> <br />Bureau tried to cut $14 million from the CUP funding for that year,67 <br />but the Utah delegation was able to restore approximately $7 mil- <br />lion.ll8 <br />Several reasons have been suggested why the Bureau has not <br />redefined its mission and why its traditional interests continue to be a <br />barrier to western water reform. First, economists' models imply that <br />the Bureau's policies are driven by rent-seeking motivations.69 The <br />bureaucratic rent-seeking model suggests that the Bureau attempts to <br />reap the benefits of federal irrigation subsidies by increasing the <br />Bureau's political power, as well as its salaries and job security.60 <br />Second, it has been suggested that the Bureau is an agency of engineers <br />who are ill-suited for modern water management and environmental <br />protection.61 They give water management "lip service," but "they <br />really have no vision of what it means.""' Despite the growing social <br />and environmental demand for alternative uses of water, the Bureau <br />and other federal agencies are too rigid to adapt to the changes," and <br /> <br />" CUP Cuts DIU to 'PiqIU,' Owe". Sayo, DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake City), Feb. 6, 1991, et <br />B5. <br />N Lee Davideon, House Ready to Reolore CUP Fund, DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake City), May <br />29-30, 1991, at 6B, <br />" Rents are defined as the returns to an owner of a resource in e:r:cess of the opportunity <br />eoete of that resource. If rents exist, profit-maximizing individuals will divert resources into <br />thOBe activities that will capture the rents. In an institutional setting, .competition by rent <br />leekers dissipates the rents to the marginal firm or individual if property rights to them cannot <br />be eotabliohed and enforced.. Randal R. Rucker & Priea V. Fishback, T"" Fe<kral Rec/aT1l4lion <br />Pro,ram; An Analyoio of Rem.SeekiTlff BeluJVior, in WATER RIGHTS: 5cARcE RESoURCE <br />Au.ocATION, BUREAUCRACY, AND TIlE ENVIRONMENT 45, 46-47 (Terry L. Andel'llOn ed" 1963). <br />" [d. at 48. <br />" See Zach Willey & Tom Graft', Ferkral Water Policy in I"" United Slateo-An Agenda for <br />EcoTU1mic and Erwironmental Reform, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 325 (1988). This article states: <br />[T]he resulting reforms now being implemented will have at best a minor effect on <br />consumptive and polluting aspects of federal reclamation projects. Over its <br />history, the Bureau has developed a tradition of water project expertise that is no <br />longer usefUl as a federal service. Current attempts to redirect that agency toward <br />a new water management and environmental protection mission seem to be ill~ <br />conceived and may result in more duplication and conflict with the missions of <br />other agencies. <br />[d. at 329. <br />ft Interview with Don Christiansen, .upra Dote 2. <br />a See Willey Ie: Graff, .upra note 61, at 330-31, stating: <br />The list of rigidities with which federal water policy is aftlicled is long indeed, The <br />growing social and environmental demand for alternative uses of water resources, <br />in addition to the urban and agricultural uses which have characterized economic <br />development in this country, have become widely recognized, but the federal policy <br />response, tuI embodied in implementation activities by the federal agencies, has <br />been inadequate. <br />