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N C:,) C)l -N 1959] ADJUDrcA'rION IN rN'rERNA'rIONAL RIVER DfSPU'!'ES 45 It must bow before all international obligations, whatever their source, but it yields only to them. [Authors' translation.] " 3. States were said by the Tribunal to be conscious of the seriousness of the conflicting interests which the industrial uses of international rivers bring into question and of the necessity of reconciling these interests by means of mutual concessions, The way to achieve such a compromise was said to be the conclusion of comprehensive agreements.'. After indi- cating that the principle of mutual concessions or of compromise of COn- flicting interests is the supreme rule, the Tribunal outlined the scope of a riparian's freedom of action, apart from treaties, as follows: International practice reflects the conviction that States have a duty to seek to enter such agreements; thus there exists an obligation to accept in good faith all negotiations jlnd contacts which will place them [the states], through a broad comparison of interests and through mutual good will, in the best position to conclude such agree- ments , , . [Authors' translation.] ,. The Tribunal premised its reasoning On a substantive rule of reason 4. of international law governing the uses of international rivers, Support for this principle was found expressly in the two constituent elements of international custom, namely, "international practice" and the "convic- tion" of states." 87 Sentenoe at- 33. Following this reasoning to its logical conclusion, the Tribunal declared that it wouJd adopt the following rules of interpretation: "Provisions of conventional law which are clear need no interpretation; . . . when interpretation is called for, it must be arrived at according to internationai law; inter- national law dOBS not sanction any absolute or rigid method of "interpretation; it is thus permitted to take into aecount the spirit which dictated the Pyrenean Treaties as well as the rules of customary international law." (Sentence at 34-35; authors' translation.) 88 Sentenoe 'at 46-47. 89 Ibid. at 47. 40 Other phrases for this eoncept are found in the authorities which speak in terms of a principl~, of tlequitable apportionment" (American Decisions, note 30 above; Dept. of State Release, note 41 below), the entitlement of co~riparians to a 'Ireason~ able and equitable sha.re" (New York Resolution of the International 'Law Association, Sept., 1958, note 41, below), or to a sharing of the' waters on a tI just and reasonable basis." (Dept. of State ,Memorandum, op. cit. note 20 above.) See authorities cited in notes 32, 36, abol'e, and in note 41 below. 41 The Tribunal's conclusions as to the presep.t state of international law as reflected in II international, practice" and in the 'I conviction" of states are a far cry from an early view of the scope of sovereign rights expressed by U. S. Attorney General Harmon in 1895. During a dispute with Mexico over the use of the waters of the Upper Rio Grande in places where both banks are in the United States, the Attorney General rendered an opinion to the effect that "the rules, principles alid precedents of :hiOOr- natio'nallaw impose no liability or obligation upon the United States." (21 Ope. Att'y. Gen. 267 [1895].) It is doubtful whether such an opinion ever truly reflected existing international law., See especially Appendices Band C in Principles. . . American Committee, op. cit. note 21 above at 74, 84, for an analysis of the history and vicissitude" of the Harmon opinion at home and abroad. A recent statement bi a witness of the Department of State testifyi~g before the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs rejected utterly the Harmon doctrine. In the - course Of hearings on the question of the proposed diversi.ons by Canada of waters from the Upper' Columbia River, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Frederick W. Jandrey, Jr., had this to. say~