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agent can be sued. The use of the disjunctive shows that suing <br /> one is not a prerequisite to suing the other. United States v. <br /> Aiken, 867 F. 2d 965 (6th Cir. 1989) . <br /> The defendants also argue that even if they are agents, any <br /> agency relationship with the corporation ended upon Resources' <br /> petition in bankruptcy. However, the cases cited by them to sup- <br /> port their argument are inapposite to the present situation. <br /> Those cases state the general proposition that contracts of agen- <br /> cy are revoked upon bankruptcy. The present cause of action is <br /> not based on contract law, but rather on the statutory right to <br /> sue the agents of the corporation for reclamation. Indeed, these <br /> defendants were not in an arms-length situation to negotiate a <br /> contract for an agency relationship as were the parties in the <br /> cases cited by them. Instead, these defendants were intimately <br /> tied with Resources and continued in their role as agents long <br /> after Resources filed for bankruptcy. <br /> Furthermore, the defendants' liability as agents began when <br /> each undertook the responsibility for environmental compliance or <br /> supervision of the mine site; their liability did not begin at <br /> the time of some sort of contract. Accordingly, their liability <br /> did not end upon the principal's bankruptcy. <br /> Lastly, the automatic stay created by the filing of <br /> Resources' bankruptcy does not support the proposition that the <br /> defendants' agency relationship ended upon Resources' bankruptcy. <br /> The automatic stay only provides that property of the estate can- <br /> not be affected without permission of the court. 11 U.S.C. 362 . <br /> The stay in no way affected the defendants' status as agents or <br /> their liability as agents of Resources. The only potential ef- <br /> fect would be that the defendants would have to go through some <br /> legal procedures to exact reclamation, or would simply have to <br /> pay for reclamation rather than to perform it. Accordingly, the <br /> defendants' argument that the bankruptcy of Resources terminated <br /> their liability as agents fails. <br /> B. THE BOARD ORDER OF MAY 1991 SETTING FORTH THE RECLAMATION <br /> SCHEDULE IS NOT A NULLITY AND *THE BOARD HAS COMPLIED WITH <br /> STATUTORY PROCEDURES. <br /> The defendants cite to 2 CCR 407-2 ; Rule 3 . 04 . 1, to assert <br /> that the complaint fails to state a claim because the Board's <br /> order requiring reclamation according to a schedule became a nul- <br /> lity upon the bankruptcy of Resources. See Dunlap v. Colorado <br /> Springs Cablevision, Inc. , 829 P.2d 1286 (Colo. 1992) (motions to <br /> dismiss for failure to state a claim are looked upon with disfa- <br /> vor) . The defendants cite the rule out of context. <br /> -5- <br />