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1999-04-01_GENERAL DOCUMENTS - C1981017 (2)
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1999-04-01_GENERAL DOCUMENTS - C1981017 (2)
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Last modified
3/16/2021 7:17:41 PM
Creation date
5/3/2012 9:33:45 AM
Metadata
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Template:
DRMS Permit Index
Permit No
C1981017
IBM Index Class Name
GENERAL DOCUMENTS
Doc Date
4/1/1999
Doc Name
DMG motion to dismiss certain claims
From
US District Court
To
Mid-Continent Resources, Inc. & DMG
Permit Index Doc Type
General Correspondence
Media Type
D
Archive
No
Tags
DRMS Re-OCR
Description:
Signifies Re-OCR Process Performed
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roads. Amended Third Party Complaint, ¶¶27-40. Second, the exact methods and scope of <br /> implementing reclamation are necessarily left to the discretion of the party performing the <br /> reclamation, in this case the Division. The Division, which is the agency which interprets and <br /> implements the Reclamation Act,must have the discretion to exercise professional judgment in <br /> performing reclamation at Coal Basin. See , United States v.Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 339 <br /> F.Supp. 554 (D. Colo. 1971); Litvak Meat Co. v. Denver Union Stock Yard Co., 303 F. Supp. <br /> 715 (D. Colo. 1969); Heron v. City of Denver, 131 Colo. 501, 283 P.2d 647 (1955). Thus, since <br /> the Reclamation Act does not waive sovereign immunity for the acts complained of, C.R.S. § 34- <br /> 33-135, and the CGIA does not waive immunity for complaints under the Reclamation Act, <br /> C.R.S. § 24-10-106, MCR's second and third claims should be dismissed. <br /> It should be noted that the Colorado Supreme Court has enumerated several factors to <br /> consider when determining whether the CGIA applies to violations of a particular statute. In <br /> State Personnel Bd. v. Lloyd, M.D., 752 P.2d 559 (Colo. 1988), the plaintiff doctor filed suit <br /> alleging retaliatory firing in violation of the State Employee Protection Act, C.R.S. § 24-50.5-101 <br /> - 107 ("EPA"), an employee whistleblower statute. The doctor failed to follow the notice <br /> provisions of the CGIA and his suit was dismissed by the trial court. On appeal, the doctor <br /> argued that the CGIA did not apply to the whistleblower statute because the latter created a new, <br /> statutory cause of action and because the two acts had"contrary purposes." Id. at 562. The <br /> Lloyd court noted that the EPA did not address certain issues necessary for it to be fully <br /> efficacious as a statute, including a statute of limitations, payment of judgments in general, <br /> settlement of claims,the effect of a judgment against a public entity, and limits on judgments. <br /> The CGIA does address these issues. "The conspicuous absence of these provisions from the <br /> 12 <br />
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