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1999, the Division filed a Motion to Dismiss regarding claims for relief contained in MidCon <br /> Realty, LLC's Third-Party Complaint. Both of the Division's motions raise issues of <br /> sovereign immunity. <br /> 4. Sovereign immunity issues implicate the subject matter jurisdiction of this Court <br /> and are to be determined in accordance with C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1). Fogg v. Macaluso, 892 P.2d <br /> 271 (Colo. 1995). <br /> 5. In addition, the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act("CGIA") provides: "If a <br /> public entity raises the issue of sovereign immunity prior to or after commencement of <br /> discovery, the Court shall suspend discovery, except any discovery necessary to decide the issue <br /> of sovereign immunity, and shall decide such issue on motion." § 24-10-108, C.R.S. <br /> 6. The plain language of the CGIA is that all discovery ceases except discovery <br /> necessary to determine the issue of sovereign immunity. It is not sufficient that the requested <br /> discovery relate to sovereign immunity; the discovery must be necessary to the determination of <br /> the issue. Mentzel v. Judicial Dept. of State of Colo, 778 P.2d 323 (Colo. App. 1989); <br /> Szymanski v. Department of Highways of State of Colo., 776 P.2d 1124 (Colo. App. 1989). <br /> 7. Given the legal nature of the sovereign immunity issues raised by the Division's <br /> motions to dismiss, neither the deposition of Mr. Renner nor the April 1 letter requesting further <br /> discovery responses, is necessary to decide the issues of sovereign immunity. Although Mr. <br /> Renner is an environmental protection specialist with knowledge of reclamation issues and <br /> statutory requirements, his deposition is not necessary to the determination of whether sovereign <br /> immunity bars the claims of the Third-Party Plaintiffs. In addition, opposing counsel's further <br /> discovery request contained in his letter of April 1 does not at all relate to to the determination of <br /> the issue of sovereign immunity. The April 1 letter goes mostly to issues of reclamation and <br /> costs; this information is not needed to determine whether the Third-Party Plaintiffs' claims are <br /> contract claims or statutory violation claims. <br /> 8. Accordingly, the Division informed opposing counsel by letter dated and faxed April <br /> 5, 1999, that the request to depose Mr. Renner and the April 1 request for further discovery <br /> responses are denied until this Court has an opportunity to rule on the sovereign immunity issues <br /> raised by the Division's motions to dismiss. Exhibit 3. <br /> 9. By facsimile dated April 8, 1999, Mr. Anderson advised undersigned counsel of his <br /> disagreement with the position the Division was taking on discovery. Exhibit 4. <br /> 10. As required by C.R.C.P. 26(c), undersigned counsel certifies that on April 8, 1999, <br /> she conferred by telephone with opposing counsel in good faith to resolve this matter without <br /> court action,but such attempt failed. The parties disagree as to what, if any, discovery can go <br /> forward at this time. <br /> 2 <br />