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e � <br /> For example, MCR's second claim for relief complains of DMG's use of reclamation <br /> funds to attempt steep slope revegetation, directly contrary to both the Reclamation Plan and the <br /> Reclamation Act. This is so because the Reclamation Plan does not call for such revegetation <br /> and because the Reclamation Act was passed in response to the congressional mandate in the <br /> Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 ("SMCRA"). See C.R.S. ti 34-33-137. <br /> SMCRA in turn, does not require reclamation of surface disruptions in mining operations <br /> occurring before the passage of that Act in 1977. 30 U.S.C. § 1234; Yates v. Island Creek Coal <br /> Co., 485 F.Supp. 995, 998 (W.D. Va. 1980). DMG and MCR have already adjudicated the <br /> question of whether the steep slopes, which DMG is attempting to revegetate with bankruptcy <br /> funds, are subject to SMCRA or .whether they are "pre-law," in other words, whether they are <br /> disturbances occurring before 1977. In 1993, DMG issued Notice of Violation No. C-93-130 to <br /> MCR for post-1977 disturbances of the down slopes below the mine benches. DMG argued that <br /> snow removal operations on the mine benches after 1977 must have redisturbed the down slopes, <br /> therefore taking the down slopes out of the "pre-law" category and thus requiring reclamation <br /> under SMCRA. The issue went to a hearing officer who ultimately denied DMG's claim, finding <br /> that DMG put forward no evidence of any post-law disturbances. See Exhibit K attached. <br /> C. Cases Cited by DMG do not Support Governmental Immunity <br /> in This Action <br /> Any remaining doubt that governmental immunity does not apply to the claims raised by <br /> MCR in this case is dispensed by a review of the cases cited by DMG which further show there is <br /> no support for such immunity. For example, in Ace Flving Service v. Colorado Dept. of <br /> Agriculture, 314 P.2d 278 (Colo. 1957), the Colorado Supreme Court specifically held that the <br /> State is not immune to suits in which the plaintiff claims a breach of contract. There, the Court <br /> stated, "The applicable principle is that when a state enters into authorized contractual relations it <br /> 11 <br />