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action by the operator. The operator then filed a <br /> Chapter 7 bankruptcy, and the state sought an injunction <br /> which would have compelled performance of the consent <br /> order. The Third Circuit held that the remedial action <br /> was being sought to prevent potential future harm. The <br /> fact that the debtor would have to spend money to carry <br /> out the consent order did not preclude the exercise of <br /> the state's regulatory powers. By requiring the debtor <br /> to expend funds to carry out a cleanup order, the Third <br /> Circuit in effect treated the debtor's environmental <br /> obligations as an ongoing administrative expense. <br /> b. Matter of Commonwealth Oil Refining Co. , 805 F.2d <br /> 1175 (5th Cir. 1986) , involved an oil refinery which was <br /> governed by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of <br /> 1976. During the pendency of the debtor's Chapter 11 <br /> case, the EPA terminated the refinery's interim permit <br /> and required the debtor to file a closure plan. The <br /> debtor argued that the EPA's actions constituted an <br /> attempt to collect a money judgment that was barred by <br /> the automatic stay. The Fifth Circuit held that forcing <br /> the debtor to spend money fell within the EPA's <br /> regulatory powers and did not represent enforcement of a <br /> money judgment. The Court rejected the debtor's argument <br /> that a showing of "imminent and identifiable harm or <br /> urgent public necessity" should be required before <br /> forcing a debtor to deplete its estate performing <br /> remedial work. <br /> C. In In re Wall Tube and Metal Products Co. , 831 F.2d <br /> 118 (6th Cir. 1987 ) , the Sixth Circuit held that <br /> environmental cleanup expenses are necessary "to preserve <br /> the estate in required compliance with state law and to <br /> protect the health and safety of a potentially endangered <br /> public, " and therefore granted such expenses <br /> administrative priority. <br /> 9 . Additional authority to support an "ongoing <br /> obligation" is provided by 28 U.S.C. S 959 (b) , which requires <br /> bankruptcy trustees and debtors in possession to "manage and <br /> operate the property in his possession. . . according to the <br /> requirements of the valid laws of the State in which such property <br /> is situated, in the same manner that the owner or possessor thereof <br /> would be bound to do if in possession thereof. " <br /> 10. In short, CSCMRA imposes on the Debtor, as mining <br /> permittee, the obligation to reclaim its mine. Case law indicates <br /> that this obligation is best understood as an administrative claim <br /> in the Debtor's bankruptcy, which can be enforced either by the <br /> collection of money or by enforcement orders requiring the Debtor <br /> to expend funds. Consistent with that interpretation, the Board <br /> has entered a post-petition order directing the Debtor to reclaim <br /> -3- <br />