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upon the parties in a subsequent proceeding if the agency that rendered the decision <br />acted in a judicial capacity and resolved disputed issues of fact which the parties had <br />an adequate opportunity to litigate." Moffat County, 732 P.2d at 620. These <br />"additional" elements for the application of res judicata in the administrative context <br />are found in MLRD's proceeding and its settlement with Mid- Continent. <br />First, MLRD acted in an adjudicative capacity. An agency acts in an <br />adjudicative or judicial capacity when its proceeding affects a specific party and <br />resolves particular issues of disputed fact by applying existing legal standards to the <br />circumstances of the case. Comm'rs Douglas County v. Public Util. Comm'n, <br />Colorado, 829 P.2d 1303, 1307 (Colo. 1992); Colorado Office of Consumer Counsel v. <br />Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 816 P.2d 278, 284 (Colo. 1991); Cherry -dills Resort <br />Dev. Co. v. City of Cherry Hills Village, 757 P.2d 622, 626 -27 (Colo. 1988). Pursuant <br />to statutory authority, MLRD acted in a judicial capacity against Mid - Continent <br />when it made pertinent findings of fact regarding the Coal Basin episode and <br />determined Mid - Continent's liability based upon those facts. <br />WQCD's assertion that MLRD's settlement agreement with Mid - Continent <br />is prosecutorial and not adjudicatory is contrary to MLRD's enabling legislation. <br />3° WQCD cites only one case for its assertion that where an agency enters into a <br />settlement agreement in exercise of its "prosecutorial functions," res judicata does not apply. <br />The case cited, United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 790 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Pa. 1992), is <br />readily distinguishable from the instant action. In Rohm, the district court refused to bar the <br />use of the prior consent order when it contained an express reservation of pertinent rights. <br />The case arose in the context of superfund litigation. The district court found that by agreeing <br />to manage a hazardous waste site under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), <br />EPA was not barred from seeking oversight costs under the Comprehensive Environmental <br />Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), because Congress clearly intended that <br />the two statutory schemes be cumulative and not mutually exclusive. <br />Mid - Continent Answer Brief <br />- 38 - Appeal No. 93 CA 297 <br />