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an adjudicatory capacity, ( 2) decided issues over which it had <br /> jurisdiction, and ( 3 ) afforded the affected party an opportunity <br /> tc litigate the claim sought to be barred. See Industrial Commis- <br /> sion v. Moffat County School District Re. No. 1, 732 P. 2d 616 <br /> (Colo. 1989 ) ; Montoya v. City of Colorado Springs, 770 P. 2d 1358 <br /> (Colo. App. 1989 ) . Absent any one of these conditions, the <br /> doctrine ' s application becomes a tool to foreclose legitimate <br /> claims . <br /> The District Court ' s analysis is completely silent regard- <br /> ing these additional conditions. In its Answer Brief, MCR at- <br /> tempts to demonstrate that the conditions ignored by the District <br /> Court were -present in this case. MCR' s arguments are unpersua- <br /> sive. <br /> A. MCR Fails to Demonstrate that the Set- <br /> tlement Agreement is a Quasi-Judicial De- <br /> termination or that In Entering Into It, <br /> the DMG Had the Authority to Settle the <br /> Violations Alleged in the WQCD' s NOV. <br /> The administrative decision claimed to bar litigation of <br /> the WQCD' s NOV in the instant case is DMG ' s settlement of DMG ' s <br /> NOV with MCR. In its Opening Brief, CDH asserts that DMG is not a <br /> "quasi-judicial" agency and that, in entering into the Settlement <br /> Agreement with MCR, DMG acted in a prosecutorial, not in an adju- <br /> dicatory capacity. MCR responds that CDH' s assertion is negated <br /> -6- <br />