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402 ( 1939 ) . CDH asserted in its Opening Brief and reasserts in <br /> this Reply, that DMG did not have the required authority and, <br /> therefore, its settlement agreement did not bind the State to <br /> forego its enforcement of the CDPS Permit . **5 <br /> In response, MCR argues that DMG did have the authority to <br /> bind the WQCD. See Answer Brief at 33-34 . Once again <br /> bootstrapping its identity of causes of action argument, MCR ar- <br /> gues that the CWQCA does not grant to the WQCD the exclusive au- <br /> thority "over effluent discharge violations. " Answer Brief at 34 . <br /> MCR' s manipulation of words and phrases does not rescue its mer- <br /> itless argument . The CWQCA' s exclusive grant of authority to the <br /> WQCD to "issue and enforce permits authorizing point source dis- <br /> charges of pollutants to surface waters of the state" is in- <br /> disputable. See § 25-8-202( 7 ) (b) ( I ) , C.R.S. ( 1989) . The fact <br /> that the legislature did so after expressly requiring the WQCD to <br /> recognize the water quality responsibilities of other state agen- <br /> cies, including DMG' s, is determinative. <br /> The plain language of the CWQCA reserves upon the WQCD the <br /> exclusive authority to issue and enforce permits authorizing the <br /> 5** CDH continues to assert, as discussed earlier in this Reply, <br /> that given that the agency action involved in this case is a set- <br /> tlement agreement and not an adjudication of the issue on the <br /> merits, the fact that DMG did not intend to settle the WQCD' s NOV <br /> precludes the doctrine ' s application, whether or not WQCD and DMG <br /> are the same party. <br /> -12- <br />