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(i.e., the ADR Plant and VLF remain fully operational during line power outages). <br />CC &V performs routine electrical and mechanical PM inspections on the generators. <br />A below -grade geomembrane liner underlies the entire ADR Plant area, including the <br />cyanide Offload and Storage Facility, and provides tertiary containment for the cyanide <br />facilities. Therefore, if the physical integrity of the concrete becomes compromised <br />temporarily by cracking, the underlying liner would provide competent secondary <br />containment. CC &V Environmental personnel monitor the liner system leak detection <br />sump, located downgradient of the ADR area, weekly. Additionally, CC &V indicated <br />that inspections of the containments (although not fully documented) had been conducted <br />regularly over the three year period between ICMC audits, and that it did not consider the <br />condition of the concrete critical in providing competent secondary containment because <br />of the underlying liner. Nonetheless, CC &V concurs that although the condition of the <br />concrete may not be critical in providing competent secondary containment, maintaining <br />its physical integrity as a best management practice is prudent. <br />During this onsite recertification audit, a number of cracks and areas of spalling were <br />observed within the concrete containment at the Offload and Storage Facility. As a <br />result, CC &V updated its inspection procedures to better document visual inspections of <br />the concrete containments at the Offload and Storage Facility and within the ADR Plant, <br />and provided copies of the updated inspection checklist as evidence. Additionally, <br />CC &V developed a new procedure providing guidance on appropriate visual standards <br />for initiating maintenance or repair on facilities. On July 19, 2010, CC &V repaired the <br />cracks and spalling in the concrete at the Offload and Storage Facility containment and <br />provided photographic evidence demonstrating that the work had been completed. On <br />September 7, 2010, CC &V provided training records as evidence that Process Operators <br />have been properly trained on the updated/new procedures and provided copies of <br />completed inspection forms demonstrating implementation of the procedures. <br />Thus, in determining that the operation was initially in substantial compliance under this <br />Standard of Practice, the auditor considered the redundant, engineered controls and <br />monitoring, and CC &V's good -faith effort to comply with the provisions of the ICMC. <br />Furthermore, no releases or water quality impacts resulted from the damaged concrete <br />and CC &V took prompt action to remedy the circumstances. The auditor subsequently <br />determined the operation to be in full compliance with this Standard once CC &V <br />demonstrated that the concrete containment had been repaired and that measures were <br />taken to prevent reoccurrence of the situation (via the evidence discussed above). <br />As previously mentioned, cyanide pipelines, pumps, and valves are inspected on a routine <br />basis. However, during this onsite audit, precipitated salts were observed on multiple <br />piping locations and a number of pumps, and valves at the Offload and Storage Facility <br />and within the ADR Plant. Because the inspection records over the past three years do <br />not specifically document the occurrence of precipitated salts, the auditor has no means to <br />determine the duration of the deficiency observed while on site, or if it was an isolated <br />incident or programmatic failure. In the auditor's professional judgment, CC &V's <br />routine inspection and maintenance programs, implemented over the past three years <br />Cresson Project <br />Name of Mine <br />September 22, 2010 <br />Signature of Lead Auditor Date <br />Page 11 of 36 <br />