2011-09-19_ENFORCEMENT - M1977300

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Rule 3.3.2 which "clarifies and reconciles the Act's overlapping regulatory concepts;" and (3) the Board "found a violation of [Cotter's] permit." (Joint Answer Brief at 20 -22.) As explained below, the Court must reject each argument. 1. The legislature did not include violations of the Act as a basis for imposing civil penalties. Defendants assert, with no legal authority or citation to the record, that "compliance with the Act and Rules is one of the most fundamental provisions in every permit." (Joint Answer Brief at 19.) Based on this unsupported assertion, Defendants leap to the conclusion that "it is apparent that the General Assembly intended that the Act and the Rules amount to `permit provisions. ' (Joint Answer Brief at 19 -20.) Defendants are wrong. By limiting civil penalties to permit violations, section 124(7) contrasts with section 124(2)(a), which allows the Board to issue a cease and desist order for "any violation of any provisions of this article or of any notice, permit, or regulation issued or promulgated under authority of this article ...." Defendants are thus left to argue that the legislature meant exactly the same thing in sections 124(2)(a) and 124(7), even though the latter section omits any reference to the Act or regulations. If accepted, Defendants' interpretation would violate a basic rule of statutory interpretation. As the Colorado Supreme Court recently emphasized, "[w]hen the General Assembly includes a provision in one section of a statute, but excludes the same provision from F another section, we presume that the General Assembly did so purposefully." In re Application for Water Rights of Well Augmentation Subdistrict of the Central Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 221 P.3d 399, 419 (Colo. 2009); see also Specialty Rests. Corp. v. Nelson, 231 P.3d 393, 397 (Colo. 2010) ( "We will not construe a statute in a manner that assumes the General 4