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Cotter suggests that the Court depart from the rule articulated by the Supreme Court in <br />Shell and adopt a rule that requires the agency to "clearly and precisely" define the conduct <br />required to comply with order. Opening Br. 3, 20. In support of this argument Cotter cites a <br />1951 Colorado case and a handful of unpersuasive decisions from other jurisdictions. Each of <br />these cases is highly distinguishable on its facts, law, and procedural posture. Cotter cannot <br />avoid the clear rule set forth in Shell. The Board's August and December Orders should be <br />upheld because they describe the conduct forbidden in such a manner that persons of common <br />intelligence can readily understand their meaning and application. Shell, 148 P.3d at 172. The <br />clarity of the August and December Orders should also be viewed in light of the fact that Cotter <br />knew its actions were prohibited. Id. Cotter has failed to establish unconstitutional vagueness <br />beyond a reasonable doubt. <br />B) The Corrective Actions in the August Order are understandable to a person of <br />common intelligence <br />Corrective Action 2 provides that Cotter must: <br />Reinitiate mine dewatering and water discharge treatment sufficient to bring the mine <br />water table to a level at least 500 feet below the Steve Level, and sufficient to reestablish <br />a hydrologic gradient away from Ralston Creek. Implementation must occur as soon as <br />possible, but no later than August 31, 2010. <br />R:0045. On August 13, 2010 the Division sent a letter to Cotter that explained the steps <br />necessary for Cotter to comply with Corrective Action 2. R:0098. The Division's letter stated <br />9 Cotter first cites Golden Press v. Rylands, 235 P.2d 592 (Colo. 1951), a case where the record contained <br />no evidence that the defendants had committed the conduct enjoined. Id. at 594. Cotter next cites to a <br />footnote in Aronov v. Napolitano, 562 F.3d 84 (1st Cir 2009), a federal immigration case. Cotter then <br />cites to Bangor &A. R. Co. v. I.C.C. 574 F.2d 1096 (1st Cir.1978), a case where the agency's order <br />required the regulated party to interpret the meaning of the statutory phrase "unlawful preferential <br />solicitation." Id at 1116. Finally, Cotter cites Lynch v. Uhlenhopp, 78 N.W. 2d 491(Ia. 1956), a case <br />where the courts holding was based on not only the vague terms of the decree but also the probability of a <br />"fine or imprisonment of unknown but real severity." Id. at 495. <br />25 <br />