2011-05-26_ENFORCEMENT - M1977300

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Because the Order's discussion of the mine pool and Ralston Creek has nothing to do with slides, no basis exists to find that the mine pool supports a violation of section 34- 32- 116(7)(h). See Order If 45, AR:00852. In fact, no basis exists in this case to find any violation of section 34-32 - 116(7)(h), as such finding is without any reasonable basis in law. See Colorado Real Estate Comm 'n v. Hanegan, 947 P.2d 933, 936 (Colo. 1997). The Defendants' response that the word "damage" includes any damage unassociated with slides is untenable. See Answer Brief at 58 -60. First, section 34- 32- 116(7)(h) is not "clear and unambiguous" on this question, as the Defendants contend. Answer Brief at 59. If, as the Defendants contend, the word damage includes any damage, there would have been no need for the legislature to include the word "slides" in section 34- 32- 116(7)(h). The legislature could have simply stated "Areas outside of the affected land shall be protected from damage." An ambiguity therefore exists in section 34- 32- 116(7)(h), making rules of statutory construction relevant to the interpretation of that section. See People v. Terry, 791 P.2d 374, 376 (Colo. 1990). The Defendants' response is also untenable because it ignores settled rules of statutory construction. They ignore the rule cited in Cotter's Opening Brief that "[t]he coupling of words denotes an intention that they should be understood in the same general sense." Opening Brief at 33. The Defendants also ignore the related canon of construction noscitur a sociis, "the meaning of a doubtful word may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of words associated with it." See Bedford v. Johnson, 78 P.2d 373, 376 (Colo. 1938). Here, the legislature used the term "damage" in association with the word "slides," indicating that "damage" does not mean any and all damage, but damage associated with slides. See Centennial Properties, Inc. v. City of 26