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Under this clear legal authority, Cotter should have had the right to defend itself by <br />introducing evidence that it was not possible to comply with the August 2010 Order. Moreover, <br />the Act mandates that a responding party be given broad evidentiary latitude. Section 124(5) <br />provides, "The board shall permit all parties to respond to the notice served, to present evidence <br />and arguments on all issues, and to conduct cross - examination required for a full disclosure of <br />the facts." Colo. Rev. Stat. § 34- 32- 124(5). <br />Despite the relevance and materiality of Cotter's evidence of impossibility, and the <br />lenient evidentiary standard established in the Act, the Board repeatedly rebuffed Cotter's <br />attempt to introduce evidence of impossibility. See, e.g., AR:0265:3 -4; AR:0269:23 -25; <br />AR:0270:6 -9. In fact, the Board would not even accept Cotter's offer of proof regarding the <br />impossibility of complying with the August 2010 Order. AR:0270:11 -13 ( "[T]he offer of proof <br />regarding impossibility will not be admitted today. "). <br />By refusing to consider Cotter's evidence of impossibility, and denying Cotter's offer of <br />proof, the Board acted contrary to law and abused its discretion. Based on the Board's unlawful <br />denial of Cotter's offer of proof, the Court must assume that Cotter could have submitted <br />evidence sufficient to establish its impossibility defense. For that reason, the December 2010 <br />Order should be declared invalid and set aside. <br />CONCLUSION <br />For the reasons stated above, the December 2010 Order exceeds the Board's statutory <br />authority, is contrary to law, denies Cotter its statutory and constitutional rights, and constitutes <br />an abuse of discretion. In addition, the Board acted without jurisdiction by effectively amending <br />26 <br />