2011-06-14_ENFORCEMENT - M1977300

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a cease - and - desist order in the August 2010 Order, and it lacked jurisdiction to modify that order after Cotter filed its appeal, the Board cannot be allowed to accomplish a de facto amendment of the August 2010 Order through the device of issuing a new order that simply purports to augment an existing order that is already subject to judicial review. The rule of Colorado Anti- discrimination Commission and its progeny would be moot if agencies were free to bolster their earlier orders by simply commencing a second round of enforcement proceedings concerning the same subject matter. The cease -and- desist order in the December 2010 Order is invalid and should be set aside. No other statutory provisions applicable to operators, such as Cotter, were at issue in the December 2010 Order. While the December 2010 Order makes a conclusion of law that "[p]ursuant to § 34- 32- 124(1), C.R.S., a violation may be found if an Operator fails to comply with a Board order that resulted from a violation of the Act," section 34- 32- 124(1) imposes no obligations on operators. See December 2010 Order ¶ 13; AR:0168. III. The Order Is Contrary to Law Because Neither the August 2010 Order Nor the December 2010 Order Clearly and Precisely Define the Conduct Required to Comply. It is axiomatic that before a party may be penalized for failure to comply with an administrative or judicial order, the order must be shown to have clearly and precisely defined the conduct required to comply. See, e.g., Golden Press, Inc. v Rylands, 235 P.2d 592, 594 (Colo. 1951) (where parties may be subjected to punishment for violation of an order, the actions required by the order "should not rest upon implication or conjecture, but the language declaring such rights or imposing burdens should be clear, specific and unequivocal so that the parties may not be misled thereby. "); Aronov v. Napolitano, 562 F.3d 84, 93 (1st Cir. 2009) ( "Before a court 20