2011-06-14_ENFORCEMENT - M1977300

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The Division's belated argument — that the August 2010 Order became part of the permit — cannot support the Board's assertion of authority that the legislature plainly did not grant to it. Section 124(7) limits the imposition of civil penalties to the violation of a "permit." The Act does not authorize the Board to impose a civil penalty for the violation of any document that may be "part of the permit file." Based on the Division's failure to allege or prove any permit violation, the December 2010 Order exceeds the Board's statutory authority and must be set aside. 4. Interpreting the Act to give the Board contempt power to enforce its own order in this case is contrary to law and would raise serious constitutional issues. There is a compelling reason why the legislature did not entrust the Board with contempt power — i.e., the power to impose substantial monetary fines to compel compliance with its own orders. In both the federal and Colorado governmental systems, it is a basic constitutional principle that only courts, not administrative agencies, should wield the power to hold parties in contempt for failure to comply with an administrative or judicial order. See, e.g., NLRB v. International Medication Systems, Ltd, 640 F.2d 1110, 1116 (9th Cir. 1981) (administrative agency "could not, under our system of government, and consistently with due process of law, be invested with authority to compel obedience to its orders by a judgment of fine or imprisonment "); People v. Swena, 296 P. 271, 272 (Colo. 1931) ( "The power to punish for contempt is a judicial power within the meaning of the Constitution. It belongs exclusively to the courts, except in cases where the Constitution confers such power upon some other body. "); Dee Enterprises v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 89 P.3d 430, 433 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003) ( "Article III of the Colorado Constitution prohibits one branch of government from exercising 14