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the stipulation entered into between CCDWP and Gilpin contains the required <br />identification. This characterization is erroneous, <br />CCDWP's Stipulation merely states that CCDWP will seek "all necessary <br />county permits or approvals". Record, p. 2906, Transcript at p. 29:13-16. This is <br />not an affirmative identification of the permits that CCDWP will seek, but rather <br />an illusory and completely nonbonding offer. The offer is expressly contingent <br />upon what permits or approvals, CCDWP in its discretion, deems necessary. The <br />statements of counsel for CCDWP, who refused during the hearing to identify even <br />one Gilpin County permit that CCDWP would seek, buttress this empty statement. <br />He further stated that, "... the applicant reserves the right to have an opinion about <br />whether all the permits that the county thinks are required, whether it agrees with <br />that." Record, p. 3268, Transcript at p. 391:16-25. Thus, the Stipulation, on its <br />face, did not constitute compliance with C.M.R. 6.4.13 and the MLRB was without <br />discretion to determine otherwise. <br />Moreover there is nothing in the C.M.R. or C.M.R. 6-4-13 in particular, that <br />gives the MLRB any discretion to waive compliance with all or any portion of <br />C.M.R. 6-4-13. <br />Thus, not only did the MLRB abuse whatever limited discretion it had to <br />determine compliance with C.M.R. 6-4-13 and thus Section 32-32.5-115(4) (a) and <br />(d), C.R.S., the MLRB acted arbitrarily and capriciously in misapplying C.M.R. 6- <br />4-13 and exceeded its statutory and regulatory jurisdiction. Moreover, the MLRB <br />misinterpreted and misapplied both Section 34-32.5-115(4)(d) C.R.S. and C.M.R. <br />6.4.13 as a matter of law, when it found that the Stipulation had met the <br />requirements of C.M.R 6.4.13. <br />4 <br />