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Defendants do not challenge the sufficiency of the Court's factual determinations which established the factual predicate for concluding that Defendants were in violation of the Gilpin County Zoning Resolution. In any event, this Court, as the rEViewing Court, must give deference to the trial Court's findings insofar as the merits of this litigation, so long as there is evidence in the record to support the Court's finding. The standazd for Defendant-Appellant review of factual determinations by the trial (County) court is a "highly differential, cleazly erroneous standazd." Miller v. Campbell, 971 P2d 261 (Colo. Appeals, 1998). On review of a County Court decision, the District Court is bound by the findings of the trial (County) Court. People v. Brown, 485 P2d 500 (1971). The Defendants instead challenge the County Court's subject matter jurisdiction. This action was brought under §30-28-124.5 C.R.S.. The statute is entitled "County Court Actions for Civil Penalties for Zoning Violations." Under this statute, any person violating any zoning resolution enacted or adopted by a Boazd ofCounty Commissioners, may be subject to the imposition by order ojthe County Court, of a civil penalty of no less than that $250.00 and no more than $500.00 per violation. The zoning resolution enacted by the Board of County Commissioners, which includes the requirement of obtaining a building permit, is attached to the Complaint and is part of the record in this case. §30-28-134.5 C.R.S. clearly vests the County Court with jurisdiction over the subject matter of this civil action. diem penalties of $100.00 per day and ($50.00 per violation) until the required permits were obtained. To the date of filing of this brief, no building permits have been obtained by the Defendant. The Defendants apparently believe that not only does the County Court lack jurisdiction over them, but that the County also lacks jurisdiction over the Defendants for any regulatory purposes, which implicate the public health, safety and welfare. This jurisdictional argument is undercut by the precedent which [hey cite - "Where ...one devotes his property [o a use in which the public has an interest (i.e. safe residential construction) ... he must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to [he extent of the interest he has thus created. He Wray withdraw ibis grant by discontinuing the use, bu! so long ns he mnintnins the use, he imrst submit to the control. Munn v. Illinois, 94 US 1 l3 (1876).