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I~ <br />Kaiser at a nice price. • <br />Why Kaiser, with a billion tons of <br />high-grade coal-enough to cover <br />sales for 300 years-needed 255 mil- <br />lion more tons isn't clear. Howard <br />Allen, chairman of Southern Califor- <br />nia Edison and a Kaiser Steel director, <br />approved the swap on behalf of Kai- <br />ser's preferred stockholders, and so <br />did his Fellow Kaiser director, retired <br />SCE Chairman William Gould. Allen, <br />who has a reputation for probity, says <br />that he relied on Eaimess opinions. <br />Kaiser shelled out $78 million for <br />the same Perma assets Frates valued <br />18 months earlier at only $65 million. <br />What's more, because the SPS con- <br />tract was valued aC only $12.2 million <br />this time around, the value of Rial's <br />coal properties must have risen to <br />$65.8 million-a 65% increase. Rial <br />claims a fairness opinion horn Don- <br />aldson, Lufkin & Jenrette blesses the <br />deal, but he won't let Footles see it. <br />With Eaimess opinions filling the <br />air, Kaiser Steel paid Eor the contract <br />and the coal with $55 million of land, <br />cash and near-cash, and assumed $23 <br />million of Perma's debts. Perma also <br />borzowed $30 million from California <br />Federal Savings & Loan Association. <br />So, Rial was in control, and Frates <br />went away happy. When the dust set- <br />tled, Frates had $20 million of cash, a <br />$6 million near-cash receivable Kaiser <br />had owned and $IS million of the <br />Kaiser land traded to Rial. Taking his <br />$40 million this way rather, than in <br />cash allows Frates ]who is now stalk- <br />ing Kaiser Aluminum to proclaim <br />with a straight face that Kaiser's prob- <br />lems today aren't his fault. <br />Rial had traded illiquid assets to <br />Kaiser Eor land and cash he could use <br />to buy out Frates and settle debts. <br />Ah, leverage., The successive <br />buyouts by Frates and Rial left Kaiser <br />light on cash and marketable assets. <br />The company, with $230 million of <br />revenue a year, was stuck with $25 <br />million of prcfcrrcd dividend pay- <br />ments annually and $27 million a <br />year for pension and health benefits to <br />6,000 steelworker families. A pre- <br />scription for disaster. <br />Even though Rial did a creditable <br />job of expanding Kaiser's coal sales, <br />the heavily leveraged company <br />couldn't meet its bills when coal <br />prices softened and its other business, <br />steel Fabricating, collapsed. Kaiser <br />missed the May and August dividends <br />on its prcfcrrcd shares and is in de- <br />fault on many of its debts. <br />Rial hasn't stinted himself, howev- <br />er. He took $2.4 million in salary last <br />year. Kaiser paid $4.6 million to <br />Perma for selling coal ]which seems <br />not unreasonable] and paid another <br />rnm~rc nr1-~rnmn <br />$388,000 for Perma's efforts to sell <br />Kaiser's oil and natural gas to others. <br />jKaiser, unfortunately, hasn't sold any <br />oil or natural gas and has little pros- <br />pect of selling any soon.j Rial claims <br />his 1986 salary was under $300,000 <br />for the first eight months, and that <br />he's cutting it to $225,000 a year. <br />Generous of him. <br />Rial is nothing if not energetic. He <br />talks about building a combination <br />waste treatment plant and industrial <br />park on Kaiser land in Fontana. He <br />claims to have a deal with the Federal <br />Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. to as- <br />sume Kaiser's pension obligations in <br />return for zero coupon debt and pre- <br />ferred stock. Zero paper=and more <br />common-is being offered to pre- <br />ferred holders. <br />Rial says Chase Manhattan Bank <br />will refinance Kaiser unless a Footles <br />story messes things up. He claims he <br />can save Kaiser, given a chance. <br />Whether he'll get one is unclear. <br />With Kaiser virtually worthless, a <br />battle has erupted over its remains. A <br />group of preferzed shareholders led by <br />M1Krteapolis stockbroker Bruce <br />Hendry jFoascs, Sept. 9, 1985j invoked <br />the preferred holders' right to take <br />over Kaiser because two dividends <br />had been missed, and hope to throw <br />out Rial at a meeting on Oct. 30. <br />Meanwhile, Fontlrs has discovered, <br />Rial effectively lost control of the <br />company in September. The Perma <br />Group's Kaiser stock was pledged as <br />collateral to Industrial Indemnity <br />jpart of Xerox' Crum & Forster insur- <br />ance subsidiary] as a guarantee of Per- <br />ma's $30 million loan Erom CalFed- <br />and Perma defaulted on that loan <br />Sept. 5. <br />This would all be funny iE it weren't <br />so sad. [f Kaiser goes under, Kaiser <br />pensioners face a cutoff of health <br />benefits, which aren't federally in- <br />sured. With Kaiser preferred recently <br />trading at under 2 a share, old Kaiser <br />Steel shareholders-some of whom <br />lost their jobs when the steel plant <br />closed-have seen millions of dollars <br />evaporate. <br />Henry f. Kaiser must be rolling in <br />his grave. ^ <br />The nation's commercial banks are losing <br />another nice chunk of the • commercial <br />loan market. This time it's medium-term <br />loans, and they are .. . <br />$~ l~~~ion <br />~~~Cffig~~ <br />Walk ®tdt the ~®~~ <br />ey Ben Webermen <br />S COMMERCIAL tlANKS gO[ shaky <br />er, credit regulation got looser <br />and competition got keener, <br />the banks couldn't drop their fees and <br />interest rates enough to keep their <br />lucrative business in short-term pa- <br />per. Corporations simply sold their <br />own debt directly to investors, or put <br />it out through a Goldman, Sachs or a <br />Merrill Lynch. <br />Investors hardly blinked. In 1971 <br />banks controlled 90% of the short- <br />term loan market. By I98G they had <br />seen SO% of a much gieater market <br />drift away to commercial paper. <br />Now they are taking the same sort <br />of beating, and For the same reasons, <br />in the $40 billion market in mcdium- <br />tcrm notes-credits that mature in <br />one to ten years or more and carry <br />charges well under the banks' lending <br />rate. As with short-term-paper, many <br />commercial banks have been forced <br />because of their own shaky balance <br />sheets to price themselves out of the <br />medium-term market for high-rated <br />companies. <br />"Many, many large curpumte bor- <br />rowers have as good or better credit <br />ratings than all but a very few of the <br />banks lending in this market," ex• <br />plains a Fed spokesman. "Moreover, <br />for large borrowers the banks no long- <br />erhave any special expertise in assess- <br />v.z <br />