I~
<br />Kaiser at a nice price. •
<br />Why Kaiser, with a billion tons of
<br />high-grade coal-enough to cover
<br />sales for 300 years-needed 255 mil-
<br />lion more tons isn't clear. Howard
<br />Allen, chairman of Southern Califor-
<br />nia Edison and a Kaiser Steel director,
<br />approved the swap on behalf of Kai-
<br />ser's preferred stockholders, and so
<br />did his Fellow Kaiser director, retired
<br />SCE Chairman William Gould. Allen,
<br />who has a reputation for probity, says
<br />that he relied on Eaimess opinions.
<br />Kaiser shelled out $78 million for
<br />the same Perma assets Frates valued
<br />18 months earlier at only $65 million.
<br />What's more, because the SPS con-
<br />tract was valued aC only $12.2 million
<br />this time around, the value of Rial's
<br />coal properties must have risen to
<br />$65.8 million-a 65% increase. Rial
<br />claims a fairness opinion horn Don-
<br />aldson, Lufkin & Jenrette blesses the
<br />deal, but he won't let Footles see it.
<br />With Eaimess opinions filling the
<br />air, Kaiser Steel paid Eor the contract
<br />and the coal with $55 million of land,
<br />cash and near-cash, and assumed $23
<br />million of Perma's debts. Perma also
<br />borzowed $30 million from California
<br />Federal Savings & Loan Association.
<br />So, Rial was in control, and Frates
<br />went away happy. When the dust set-
<br />tled, Frates had $20 million of cash, a
<br />$6 million near-cash receivable Kaiser
<br />had owned and $IS million of the
<br />Kaiser land traded to Rial. Taking his
<br />$40 million this way rather, than in
<br />cash allows Frates ]who is now stalk-
<br />ing Kaiser Aluminum to proclaim
<br />with a straight face that Kaiser's prob-
<br />lems today aren't his fault.
<br />Rial had traded illiquid assets to
<br />Kaiser Eor land and cash he could use
<br />to buy out Frates and settle debts.
<br />Ah, leverage., The successive
<br />buyouts by Frates and Rial left Kaiser
<br />light on cash and marketable assets.
<br />The company, with $230 million of
<br />revenue a year, was stuck with $25
<br />million of prcfcrrcd dividend pay-
<br />ments annually and $27 million a
<br />year for pension and health benefits to
<br />6,000 steelworker families. A pre-
<br />scription for disaster.
<br />Even though Rial did a creditable
<br />job of expanding Kaiser's coal sales,
<br />the heavily leveraged company
<br />couldn't meet its bills when coal
<br />prices softened and its other business,
<br />steel Fabricating, collapsed. Kaiser
<br />missed the May and August dividends
<br />on its prcfcrrcd shares and is in de-
<br />fault on many of its debts.
<br />Rial hasn't stinted himself, howev-
<br />er. He took $2.4 million in salary last
<br />year. Kaiser paid $4.6 million to
<br />Perma for selling coal ]which seems
<br />not unreasonable] and paid another
<br />rnm~rc nr1-~rnmn
<br />$388,000 for Perma's efforts to sell
<br />Kaiser's oil and natural gas to others.
<br />jKaiser, unfortunately, hasn't sold any
<br />oil or natural gas and has little pros-
<br />pect of selling any soon.j Rial claims
<br />his 1986 salary was under $300,000
<br />for the first eight months, and that
<br />he's cutting it to $225,000 a year.
<br />Generous of him.
<br />Rial is nothing if not energetic. He
<br />talks about building a combination
<br />waste treatment plant and industrial
<br />park on Kaiser land in Fontana. He
<br />claims to have a deal with the Federal
<br />Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. to as-
<br />sume Kaiser's pension obligations in
<br />return for zero coupon debt and pre-
<br />ferred stock. Zero paper=and more
<br />common-is being offered to pre-
<br />ferred holders.
<br />Rial says Chase Manhattan Bank
<br />will refinance Kaiser unless a Footles
<br />story messes things up. He claims he
<br />can save Kaiser, given a chance.
<br />Whether he'll get one is unclear.
<br />With Kaiser virtually worthless, a
<br />battle has erupted over its remains. A
<br />group of preferzed shareholders led by
<br />M1Krteapolis stockbroker Bruce
<br />Hendry jFoascs, Sept. 9, 1985j invoked
<br />the preferred holders' right to take
<br />over Kaiser because two dividends
<br />had been missed, and hope to throw
<br />out Rial at a meeting on Oct. 30.
<br />Meanwhile, Fontlrs has discovered,
<br />Rial effectively lost control of the
<br />company in September. The Perma
<br />Group's Kaiser stock was pledged as
<br />collateral to Industrial Indemnity
<br />jpart of Xerox' Crum & Forster insur-
<br />ance subsidiary] as a guarantee of Per-
<br />ma's $30 million loan Erom CalFed-
<br />and Perma defaulted on that loan
<br />Sept. 5.
<br />This would all be funny iE it weren't
<br />so sad. [f Kaiser goes under, Kaiser
<br />pensioners face a cutoff of health
<br />benefits, which aren't federally in-
<br />sured. With Kaiser preferred recently
<br />trading at under 2 a share, old Kaiser
<br />Steel shareholders-some of whom
<br />lost their jobs when the steel plant
<br />closed-have seen millions of dollars
<br />evaporate.
<br />Henry f. Kaiser must be rolling in
<br />his grave. ^
<br />The nation's commercial banks are losing
<br />another nice chunk of the • commercial
<br />loan market. This time it's medium-term
<br />loans, and they are .. .
<br />$~ l~~~ion
<br />~~~Cffig~~
<br />Walk ®tdt the ~®~~
<br />ey Ben Webermen
<br />S COMMERCIAL tlANKS gO[ shaky
<br />er, credit regulation got looser
<br />and competition got keener,
<br />the banks couldn't drop their fees and
<br />interest rates enough to keep their
<br />lucrative business in short-term pa-
<br />per. Corporations simply sold their
<br />own debt directly to investors, or put
<br />it out through a Goldman, Sachs or a
<br />Merrill Lynch.
<br />Investors hardly blinked. In 1971
<br />banks controlled 90% of the short-
<br />term loan market. By I98G they had
<br />seen SO% of a much gieater market
<br />drift away to commercial paper.
<br />Now they are taking the same sort
<br />of beating, and For the same reasons,
<br />in the $40 billion market in mcdium-
<br />tcrm notes-credits that mature in
<br />one to ten years or more and carry
<br />charges well under the banks' lending
<br />rate. As with short-term-paper, many
<br />commercial banks have been forced
<br />because of their own shaky balance
<br />sheets to price themselves out of the
<br />medium-term market for high-rated
<br />companies.
<br />"Many, many large curpumte bor-
<br />rowers have as good or better credit
<br />ratings than all but a very few of the
<br />banks lending in this market," ex•
<br />plains a Fed spokesman. "Moreover,
<br />for large borrowers the banks no long-
<br />erhave any special expertise in assess-
<br />v.z
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