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GENERAL50298
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Last modified
8/24/2016 8:34:15 PM
Creation date
11/23/2007 5:51:08 PM
Metadata
Fields
Template:
DRMS Permit Index
Permit No
M1986104
IBM Index Class Name
General Documents
Doc Date
12/7/1998
Doc Name
SUPPLEMENT TO NOVEMBER 11 1998 TELEPHONE NOTIFICATION
From
DMG
To
U S COAST GUARD G-OFP
Media Type
D
Archive
No
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• <br />The National Response Center <br />December 2, 1998 <br />Page 2 <br />drums matched up well with the description on the Repco Kill II MSDS. <br />Assuming that the barrels were ] 00% full, that none of the 2,4D had broken <br />down, and that the drums' entire contents were spilled, a 2% solution of 2,4D <br />would equate to 20 lbs. (or less) of 2,4D, well below the RQ of 100 lbs. <br />2. The national consulting company Dames & Moore has now completed initial <br />sampling at various locations at B&B's Aontgomery Pit facility. We received <br />back their preliminary results on November 20, 1993. The sampling of the <br />remaining road-base which has not been processed, revealed two facts of <br />importance: First, the 2,4D concentration in the sample was quite low (1.2 ppm); <br />second, that sample showed the presence of diesel fuel, which constitutes more <br />than 90% of Repco Kill Q. Taken together, these test results further corroborate <br />that the material spilled on the road-base pile was Repco Kill II. <br />Finally, based on our investigation, it appears likely that the spillage of the 2,4D <br />did not result in a release in excess of an RQ to the environment. Additionally, <br />the spill resulted in exposure only to persons "solely within a workplace," and did <br />not cause off-site exposure to persons outside the site on which the Montgomery <br />facility is located. Therefore, under the terms of CERCLA Section 101(22) <br />(definition of "release"), as well as the exception in Section 3.04(a)(4) of the <br />Emergency Planning and Commtiniry Right-to-Know Act of 1986 for onsite <br />releases which do not cause exposure to off-site persons, it appears probable that, <br />even if the incident had exceeded the 2,4D RQ, no notification was required under <br />these statutory provisions. <br />Based on all of these facts and considerations, it now appears that the November 6, 1998 <br />notification was not legally required. The same also appears to be true of a second incident <br />which the company has learned about in the course of its follow-up investigation to the <br />November 6 notification. Apparently, in summer 1997, a similaz incident occurred in which two <br />drums of weed killer were spilled onto the road-base pile at the Montgomery Pit facility and <br />subsequently processed into asphalt. Based on the facts available, it appears that this incident <br />also involved Repco Kill II (a 2% solution of 2.4D), the amount released did not exceed the <br />100 lbs. RQ for 2,4-D and did not result in off-site ornon-worker exposure. Nevertheless, <br />following the same cautionary approach that we have used thus far, we are using this follow-up <br />written supplement to inform NRC of this prior incident as well. <br />Finally, we wish to notify you of some of the response actions which B&B has taken [o <br />react promptly and effectively to this situation: <br />
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