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t <br />i <br />t e Exclusive Acce.tance Period expires on or about 1^.av 6, 1991. <br />Debtcrs seek a 120-day extension of both periods. <br />Section 1121 of the Bankruptcy Coda prcvides that the <br />Ccurt, for cause, may reduce or increase the Exclusive Filing and <br />tr_a Exclusive Acceptance Periods (the Exclusive Filing and <br />Exclusive P.cceptance Periods together will be referred to as the <br />"Exclusive Periods"). Although the Bankruptcy Code does not <br />define the term "cause," many courts have construed the tern. <br />The deter:;iaation of whether to extend the debtcr's <br />exclusive pericds i= a decision committed to the sound discreticr: <br />o_° the bankruptcy court based upon the circumstances of each <br />particular case. In re Murray, 116 Bankr. 6, 9 n. 3 (D. Mass <br />1990); In re RC~I Anlaaenivestitionen Frodsaesellschaft II - <br />honr..anditaesellschaft a/k/a RC'i II, 118 Bankr. 460, 463-6= (;d.D. <br />Mich. 1990) (denying motion for leave to appeal order extending <br />exclusive period; bankruptcy court found extension "warranted <br />based en the facts and circumstances of the case"); In re Gibson <br />& Cush.:~an Dredcing_Coro., 101 Bankr. 405, 404 (E.D.PI.Y. 1989) <br />(flexibility inheres in "cause" standard); First American Bark of <br />New Ycrn v. Southwest Gloves and Safety Ecuioment. Inc., 64 <br />Bankr. 963, 965 (D. Del. 1986); In re Public Service Co. of Pte .r <br />Hamnsh~.re, 88 Bankr. ~21, 534 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1988) ("t'ne <br />legislative intent has been construed to leave the question to <br />the reorganization court in the exercise of its discretion and to <br />promote maximum flexibility to suit various types of <br />reorganization proceedings"); In re Texaco, Inc., 76 Bankr. 322, <br />325 (Bankr. S.D.PI.Y. 1987). The legislative history cf 11 U.S.C. <br />3 <br />