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/ - ~~.:- <br />,: ~ :. <br />view, the statute requires the comparison of each party's fault <br />irrespective of whether such fault is attributable to simple <br />negligence, gross negligence, or willful and reckless <br />negligence. <br />Our courts have consistently recognized the distinction <br />between simple negligence and negligence consisting of willful <br />and wanton conduct. See, e.g., Pettingell v. Moede, 129 Colo. <br />484, 271 P.2d 1038 (1954); CJI-Civ. 2d 9:32 (1980) (defining <br />"willful and wanton negligence"). We presume that in enacting <br />the comparative negligence statute, the General Assembly Baas <br />aware of this distinction. See Rauschenberger v. Radetsky, 745 <br />P.2d 640 (Colo. 1987). Had the General Assembly intended to <br />preclude application of the comparative negligence statute in <br /> cases involving willful and wanton negligence, it could have <br /> done so expressly. Its failure to do so leads us to conclude <br />that the comparative negligence statute applies to tort actions <br />based on all forms of negligent conduct. Cf. Carman v. Heber, <br />43 Colo. App. 5, 601 P.2d 646 (1979) (a finding of intentional <br />wrongdoing renders the comparative negligence statute <br />inapplicable). <br />II <br />Plaintiff next contends the trial court erred in refusing <br />to award prejudgment interest pursuant to §5-12-102, C.R.S. <br />(1988 Cum. Supp.). <br />-3- <br />