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GENERAL32163
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Last modified
8/24/2016 7:54:53 PM
Creation date
11/23/2007 7:13:12 AM
Metadata
Fields
Template:
DRMS Permit Index
Permit No
M1998014
IBM Index Class Name
General Documents
Doc Date
7/31/2003
Doc Name
Over Burden Stockpile Stability
From
DMG - ACS
To
DMG - SSS
Media Type
D
Archive
No
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Memo to Steve Shuey 2 July 31, 2003 <br />Gypsum Ranch Pit Permit No. M-1998-014 <br />if the gravel deposit had a 38 degree friction angle and 160 psf cohesion. Problematically, the cohesive strength <br />shown by sand and gravel deposits may not be relied upon for slope stability as it is not true cohesive strength <br />but rather is a pore water presswe effect termed apparent cohesion. <br />A second slope stability analysis of the west profile was conducted. The analysis 2 failwe surface initiates more <br />toward the front of the over burden stockpile, and is still significant but is a much smaller failwe zone than that <br />analyzed as analysis 1. Using the shear strength parameters shown in figwe 2, the analysis 2 failwe surface <br />shows a safety factor of 0.53. Obviously, if 0.53 were the true safety factor, the slope would already have failed. <br />In order to better understand the physics of the analysis 2 failure surface, two sets ofback-analyses were <br />conducted. These back analyses show that for the analysis 2 failwe surface to have a safety factor of 1.5, the <br />gravel deposit would need a friction angle of 72 at zero cohesion. For a safety factor of l.l, the gravel deposit <br />would need a friction angle of 64 at zero cohesion. Both of these friction angles are well above the range of <br />feasible friction angles for a sand and gravel deposit. Then why has the slope not yet failed? Again, apparent <br />cohesion is a likely factor. For example, the analysis 2 failwe swface has a safety factor of 1.0, meaning it is on <br />the cusp of failwe, if the friction angle in the gravel deposit were 45 degrees and the cohesion were 450 psf. <br />The analyses documented in the attachments and discussed above consider circular failure swfaces. Whereas <br />observations at the location of the west profile indicate that the operating system of slope failwes at the edge of <br />the cliff is undercutting of the evaporite bedrock by the sharp outside bend in the Eagle River, which causes <br />infrequent but occasionally large scale calving of bedrock slabs into the river. The mass wasting of the bedrock <br />undercuts the terrace gravel deposit leading to progressive calving of the gravel and leaving a vertical gravel <br />cliff face, but this mechanism of failwe does not preclude the possibility that circular failwes may occur in the <br />futwe or that they have occurred in the past. These observations demonstrate that failwe along the escarpment <br />is progressive, continuing, and occasionally massive. Based on these observations, it is certain that if the over <br />burden stockpile were to remain where it is for a long enough period of time, there would be a failwe that would <br />result in overburden being dumped into the Eagle River. Such an occurrence would be a violation of the Land <br />Reclamation Act for the Extraction of Construction Materials both as an unacceptable off-site impact and as a <br />failure to minimize impacts to the hydrologic balance. There is no way to predict when such a failure would <br />occur, nor is it possible to predict the magnitude of the next or any subsequent failures. Slope failures most <br />frequently occw as a result of some triggering action; in the case of the escarpment, the trigger could be a large <br />calving of bedrock, a period of persistent rainfall, or an earthquake. Failure could also occur without an <br />apparent triggering mechanism. Resultingly, DMG has determined that the placement of an over burden <br />stockpile at the location of the west profile poses an unacceptable risk to the Eagle River. <br />As discussed above, the west profile is located at the least stable spot along the rim of the escarpment. Other <br />areas of the escarpment are less steep, are not being as aggressively undercut by the river, and have more space <br />between the edge of the over burden stockpile and the edge of the cliff. During the March 14, 2003 site <br />inspection, measurements were taken of a second, apparently more stable profile called the east profile. Across <br />section of the east profile with annotations of the shear strength parameters is presented in figure 3 attached to <br />this memo. The stability analyses of the east profile are included as attachment 2. The east profile was analyzed <br />to determine if the entire over burden stockpile along the escarpment is unstable or if only the critical areas, such <br />as the west profile location, are a problem. <br />Analysis 1 of the east profile looks at a failwe swface that initiates at the toe of the over burden stockpile and <br />terminates at the contact between the loose gravel and the bedrock. If a failure were to occw on this surface, <br />none of the overbwden pile would slough. The safety factor for this failwe surface is 1.00, indicating that the <br />slope is metastable at this location. The results of analysis 1 further show that locating the stockpile back from <br />the edge of the cliff greatly reduces the risk that any of the stockpile will fail into the river. <br />
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