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A$NOLD 8e POI~TEA Mr. Michael Lonq December 9, 1992 Page 7 performance bond," and the term "applicant" is sepa- rately defined to mean "a person applying for a permit," which would not encompass guarantors like Harrison Western, which neither applied for, nor received, a per- mit. Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 34-33-103(17), -113(1) (emphasis added). The same provision further specifies that the bond must cover the area "upon which the applicant will initiate and conduct surface coal mining and reclamation operations," which, again, would exclude guarantors. ~. (emphasis added). Other provisions provide that bonds must be "executed by the applicant and a corporate surety," unless "the applicant demon- strates that he has the financial means sufficient to self-bond." Id. at § 34-33-113(2), (3) (emphasis added). The legislative declaration similarly indicates that only "those persons involved in surface coal mining operations" should be required to "reclaim the land affected by their operations." Id. at § 34-33-102. Plainly, bonds are to be submitted by the applicant and, if appropriate, a corporate surety. Nor is such authority "necessary" to achieve the Board's statutory objectives. Given that the Board has apparently never accepted a guarantor bond on any other occasion in the 16 years that the Act has been in place, it is difficult to understand how such authority could be considered a necessity. As illustrated by this case, the use of guarantor bonds leads to confusion and un- fairness, by imposing costly and unanticipated responsi- bilities upon a party who, unlike the applicant, is not responsible for the disturbance in question and, unlike a surety, is not in the bonding business and receives no consideration for undertaking these responsibilities. In addition, in this case the guarantor, Harrison-Western, intended to limit the bond to a brief option period and did not intend to assume responsibil- ity for the underlying reclamation obligations, an intention that was apparently understood and encouraged by the Division. This suggests that the bond was in- fected by mutual mistake or was obtained through inequitable conduct, either of which would justify reci- sion of the bond. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Hill, 283 P.2d 963, 965 (Colo. 1955) (mutual mistake); Bovles Brothers Drilling v. Orion Industries, 761 P.2d 278, 281 (Colo. App. 1988) (inequitable conduct).