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in lower Stewart Gulch (T3S R96W section 9). The valves would allow for damage <br />isolation and emergency pipeline shut-down and maintenance and divide the line into 3 <br />sepazable components: a 9-mile stretch above the Pazachute facility, a 15-mile stretch below <br />the Piceance Plant site and a 20 mile section between. <br />The product pipeline would be continuously monitored for pressure and flow and inspected <br />aerially 26 times per year for leaks and activities/situations that may pose a threat to pipeline <br />integrity. <br />Small leaks would be detected through routine inspection or discrepancies in instrumentation <br />readings. Smaller leaks would be resolved by verifying the location of any release, isolating <br />the leaking section, promptly repairing/teplacing damaged pipe sections with materials stored <br />on-site, and applying any necessary spill clean-up and reclamation as developed in <br />consultation with BLM and affected landowners. <br />In an emergency, the approximate 1.5 million gallons of fluids in the pipeline transport and <br />recycling system could be emptied into an existing above-ground tank at the Pazachute Site <br />(currently two 2.1 million gallon and two 6.3 million gallon storage tanks on site). Similarly, <br />sufficient tank storage capacity and/or backup delivery systems (through pipeline to Pazachute <br />site) exist at the Piceance site to account for emergency purging of the 75,000 gallons <br />contained within the Piceance wellfield pipeline system. <br />A major pipeline breach of rupture indicated by report or instrumentation would prompt an <br />• immediate shut down of the pipeline system, curtailing introduction of additional product or <br />water into the pipeline and thereby limiting releases from the rupture. The rupture location <br />would be verified and the manual valves closed to isolate the damaged section. Appropriate <br />response persons would be notified and actions necessary to contain the spill instituted. A <br />high priority in this case will be to prevent or minimize product entry into waterways via <br />berming. Manufactured containment devices will also be available at the Piceance and <br />Pazachute sites and a vacuum truck will be available for smaller incidents. Although <br />extremely unlikely, a worst case massive and catastrophic failure would involve the potential <br />release of 300,000 (about 1 acre-foot) and 700,000 (about 2 acre-feet) gallons of sodium <br />solution to Pazachute Creek and Piceance Creek, respectively. <br />Hydrostatic testing water will originate from Pazachute facility sources. Water quality would <br />be tested to ensure that any dischazges (Parachute site) would be consistent with state water <br />quality standazds and dischazge permit provisions. <br />Groundwater <br />Considerable attention and concem has been focused on mining's potential for contaminating <br />groundwater sources in the vicinity of the Piceance leases. The Draft EIS (section 4.4.2) <br />addresses the concem for contamination (i.e., mixing) of generally better quality water in an <br />upper aquifer with generally poorer quality water in a lower aquifer. In the event fluid <br />migration were to occur across the Mahogany Zone (a feature separating the upper and lower <br />aquifers), American Soda's mine plan and the EPA's Underground Injection Control (UIC) <br />permit would not allow mining to continue. Potential for significant impacts to groundwater <br />quality will be minimized by various measures, including: proper cementing of wellbores, <br />