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MILLER v. CARNATION CO. GV ~ Cnb-App. 3M PSE 13] or seasonal basis. The}• are absolute. It was within the discretion of the jury to determine when and how extensively the Millers suffered, and there u no indication in the record that their determination is without foundation. Bohlender v. Oster, supra. II. Carnation argues that the exemplary damage award was excessive and that the trial court would have, and should have, remitted the award or ordered a new trial. According to Carnation, the trial court m freined from striking the exemplary dam- age award because it failed to properly interpret our opinion in Miller v. Carnation, supra In iu order denying the motion for a new trial, the trial court noted its disa- greement with the exemplary damage award. This alone, however, does not war- rant areversal of the verdict. [7-10] In overseeing the functions of the jury, it is not the place of the trial judge to sit az a thirteenth juror. Although the court may disagree with the verdict, the granting of a motion fora new trial is improper where the evidence palpably sup- ports the verdict In the face of conflicting evidence, the trial court may not substitute iu view for that of the jury. Scott v. Mauuda, 127 Colo. 267, 255 P2d 403 (1953). The plaintiffs were entitled to an instroc- tion on exemplary damages, since there was evidence to support it Miller v. Carnation Co., supra The trial court's action in not setting aside the exemplary damage award, despite iu disagreement with the verdict is, therefore, consistent with established prin- ciples, and the record does not justify rever- sal of iu denial of a new trial. [11,12] Carnation further contends that the trial court failed to consider whether the damages were exceavive, but we do not agree. This court is not warranted in az- suming that the trial court ignored the question of excessiveness simply because it noted iu disagreement with the jury but did not reduce the award. On the contrary, the trial court is presumed to have con- sidered all properly raised objections. See Colo. 131 Nelson c•. Centennial Casualty Co., 130 Colo. 66, 273 P?d 121 (1954 ). [13, 14] We also reject Carnation's posi- tion that the amount of exemplary damages was excev~ve az a matter of law. While exemplary damages must bear a reasonable relationship to compensaton• damages, Montgomery v. Tuftortl, 165 Colo. 18, 437 P.2d 36 (1968), no fixed mathematical for- mula exisu to determine reasonableness. Wegner c•. Rodeo Cowboys Ass'n., 290 F.Supp. 369 (D.Colo.1968), aff'd., 417 F2d 881 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 903, 90 S.Ct. 1688, 26 L.Ed.2d 60 (1970). The relationship between exemplary and compensatory damages is but one test to be applied in assessing the excessiveness of the award. Of equal importance, the verdict must be sufficient to punish the defendant and effectively deter others in similar cir- cumstances. Beebe v. Pierce, 185 Colo. 34, 521 P.2d 1263 (1974); see also Comment, Exemplary Damages in Colorado-Punitive or Puny?, 35 U.CoIo.L.Rev. 394 (1963). [15, 16] Here, there was sufficient evi- dence of Carnation's wanton and reckless disregard for the Millers' righu to justify submission of the question to the jury. Mil- ler v. Carnation Co., supra; see also Barker v. Colorado Region-Spore Car Club of America, Ins, 35 Colo.App. 73, 532 P ~d 372 (1974). Carnation's financial status was a proper factor for jury consideration. The award was not so large in relation to the purposes underlying § 13-21-102, C.R.S. 1973, and in relation to Carnation's finan- cial resources as to require reversal by this court III. (171 We need no[ reach the menu of Carnation's additions] assignmenu. These were first raised in a document entitled "Supplement to Defendant's Motion for New Trial." Under a time extension grant- ed by the trial court, Carnation waz permit- ted [o file iu motion for new trial up to and including February 25, 1975. The motion for new trial was filed on that day, setting forth, inter alia. the contentions considered C~