Mined Land Reclamation Board
<br />June 12, 2006
<br />Page 4
<br />plain statutory language, King Mountain may not convert the 110 Permit to a 112 Permit until it
<br />has operated the gravel pit for a minimum of two years -- i.e.. until September 10, 2006, at the
<br />earliest.
<br />The Ranch Owners anticipate that King Mountain will azgue that C.R.S. §34-32.5-
<br />110(5)(a) applies only to the original permittee. In particular, King Mountain may claim that
<br />Rule 1.11.2 states that "the original Permittee cannot convert a Permit unless the permit has been
<br />in existence for 2 consecutive years." Read in conjunction with C.R.S. §34-32.5-110(5)(a),
<br />however, this Rule is not inconsistent with the Act. Rather, it simply confums that the original
<br />holder of a permit cannot convert it until it has been in existence for at least two years. It does
<br />not state that a successor operator is eligible to convert a permit if it holds such permit for a
<br />lesser period of time even though the original permittee held it for two consecutive years. Indeed,
<br />the Rule is silent in that regazd. However, to the extent Rule 1.11.2 is deemed inconsistent with
<br />the Act, C.R.S. §34-32.5-110(S)(a) governs. Martinez v. Dept of Personnel & Admin. Executive
<br />Office, 2006 WL ]028900 (Colo. App. 2006) (holding that, unless expressly or impliedly
<br />authorized by statute, administrative rules and regulations are without force and effect if they add
<br />to, change, modify, or conflict with an existing statute); Cartwright v. State Bd. of Accountancy,
<br />796 P.2d 51 (Colo. App. 1990) (holding that an administrative agency regulation may not modify
<br />or contravene an existing statute, and any regulation that is inconsistent with or contrary to
<br />statute is void).
<br />In addition, the Boazd must give effect to the intent of the legislature. State v. Nieto, 993
<br />P.2d 493 (Colo. 2000). That intent is determined by examining the plain language of the statute.
<br />Colorado Water Conservation Bd. v. Upper Gunnison River Water.Conservancy Dist., 109 P.3d
<br />S8S, S93 (Colo. 2005)(quoting Pierson v. Black Canyon Aggregates, Inc., 48 P.3d 1215, 1218-19
<br />(Colo. 2002))("[I]f courts can give effect to the ordinary meaning of the words adopted by a
<br />legislative body, the statute should be construed as written since it may be presumed that the
<br />General Assembly meant what it clearly said:'). In this case, the plain language of C.R.S. §34-
<br />32.5-110(S)(a) authorizes only those gravel pit operators who have held permits for over two
<br />years to request conversions. The statute cleazly applies to any operator, not just the original
<br />permittee. Conversely, anyone else, including a successor operator, who has held a permit for
<br />less than two years is not eligible to apply for a conversion. Had the legislature desired or
<br />intended to allow successor operators to piggy-back on the term of the prior operator's permit, it
<br />could have done so. But it did not. Therefore, this Board is required to give effect to C.R.S.
<br />§34-32.5-110(5)(a) as written, and apply it to a~ operator, including successor operators.
<br />Likewise, when a statute, such as the Act, specifies certain situations in which it is to
<br />apply, it must be construed to exclude all other situations not specified. Holliday v. Bestop, Inc.,
<br />23 P.3d 700, 706 n. 5 (Colo. 2001) (recognizing the rule of statutory construction "expression
<br />unius est exclusion alterius," the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of the other);
<br />Beeghly v. Mack, 20 P.3d 610, 613 (Colo. 2001); Holdridge v. Bd. of Educ., 881 1'.2d 448, 450
<br />(Colo. App. 1994). By expressly not articulating any exceptions to an operator's ability to apply
<br />for a permit conversion i.e., excluding successor operators from that requirement), the General
<br />Assembly cleazly intended to require ~ operator to hold a permit for at least two consecutive
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