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2002 U.S. Dist LEXIS 15217, ' controversy exceeds $ 75,000, other than to state the following: "[Plaintitf] seeks a declaration that it is entitled to possession of real property claiming that it has title to the subject tract and all improvemenzs. The value of the tract and fertilizer plant clearly exceeds the jurisdictional minimum of $ 75,000. Accordingly, the amount in controversy requirement is satisfied." Defendant's notice contains only two additional references to monetary amounts. First, Defendant claims that it acquired the Boos Brothers' interest in the Missouri River tract, as well as other property rights of the Boos Brothers, ['S] in 2977 for $ 300,000. Second, Defendant contends that it owns and has paid all of the personal and real property taxes on the Missouri River tract for the past twenty-five years. Defendant does not outline the specific amount'of taxes paid in the notice of removal. II. STANDARD FOR REMAND (HNl] A defendant may remove a case filed in state court only if the plaintiff could have filed suit in federal court originally. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). "If at any time before final judgment it appears that the distriM court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded." Id. § 1447(c). As the party invoking the federal court's jurisdiction, the defendant carries the burden of demonstrating that the requirements for exercising jurisdiction are present. Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 251 F.3d 1284, 1190 (10th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). "Because the courts of the United States are courts of limited jurisdiction, there is a presumption against federal jurisdiction." Frederick & Warinner v. Lundgren, 962 F. Supp. 1580, /582 (D. Kan. 1997) (citing Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 495 F1d 906, 909 (10th Cir. 1974)). (*6) "Doubtful cases must be resolved in favor of remand." Thurkill v. Menninger Clinic, Inc., 72 F. Supp. Zd 1232, 1234 (D. Kan. 1999) (citing Laughlin v. Kmart Corp., SO Fad 871, 873 (10th Cir. 1995) (further citations omitted)). III. DISCUSSION Plaintiff seeks to remand this case on two grounds. First, Plaintiff contends that the court tacks diversity subject [natter jurisdiction over the case because Defendant cannot show that the amount in controversy exceeds $ 75,000. Second, Plaintiff azgues that one of Defendant's counterclaims against Plaintiff requires joinder of a party, the State of Kansas, over which the court cannot acquire jurisdiction pursuant fo tbe Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution. Plaintiff also requests that the court award it the costs and attorney fees it has expended in moving to remand the action to state court. A. Amount in Controversy [HIJ2J In the Tenth Circuit, "the amount in controversy is ordinarily Page 3 determined by the allegations of the complaint, or, where they aze not dispositive, by the allegations in the notice of removal." Laughlin, 50 Fad at 873 (citing Lonnquist v. J C. Penney Co., 421 F.1d 597, 599 (10th Cir. 1970)). (•7J The defendant must "set forth, in the notice of removal itself, the 'underlying faczs supporting [the] assertion that the amount in controversy exceeds [$ 75,000]'" Id. (quoting Gaul v. Miles, Inc., 980 F1d 564, 567 (9th Cir. 1991)). The defendant must establish the requisite jurisdiMional amount in controversy by a preponderance of the evidence. Martin, 251 Fad at 1290 (citations omitted). Coaclusory allegations of jurisdiction aze insufficient, Honeycutt v. Dillard's, /ne., 989 F. Supp. 1375, 1377 (D. Kan. )997) (citing Gaus, 980 F.2d at 567), and "after-the-fact-zationalization[s]" that the defendant has met its burden will not be considered by tht court, Alley v. Am Med. Sys., No. 98- 2217- KHV, 1998 WL 596715, at '2 (b. Kan. July 22, 1998) (citing Gray v. NY. Lije Ins. Co., 906 F Supp. 628, 637 (N.D. Ala. 1995)). Plaintiff did not allege an amount in controversy in its petition in dtis case. Plaintiff requested only that the court "awazd to Plaintiff from Defendant, the possession of the Property; award to Plaintiff, from Defendant, Plaintiffs costs of collection ['8) incurred herein, including reasonable attorneys' fees; and grant Plaintiff such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper." Therefore, under Laughlin, the court is limited to examining whether the underlying facts advanced by Defendant in its notice of removal establish by a prepondemnce of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $ 75,000. [HN3] Where, as here, a plaintiff seeks injunctive or equitable relief related to possession of property, "the amount in controversy is the value of the realty duectly affected." Sanchez v. Taylor, 377 F2d 733, 736 (10th Cir. 1967) (citations omitted); A. C. McKoy, Inc. v. Schonwald, 34/ FId 737, 739 (10th Cir. 1965) (citations omitted); Ronzio v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., 116 F1d 604, 606 (10th Cir. 1940) (citations omitted). The court may examine the value of the realty from the perspective of either the plaintiff ar the defendant Ronzio, !I6 F.Zd ae 606 (citations oadtted). Defendant has not advanced sufficient underlying facts in its notice of removal to establish that the value of the Missouri River tract, from the perspective of either ["9] party, exceeds the jurisdictional arinunum of $ 75,000. Most importantly, Defendant's notice of removal never provides the court with a specific allegation of the amount in controversy. Defendant alleges in its notice only that: "[Plaintiff] seeks a declaration that it is entitled to possession of real property claiming that it has title to