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(Colo. App. 1986). ~/ This personal property right extends to the waste material or tailings removed from the ore during processing operations unless that right is lost by abandonment or some other reason. United States, George B. Conway intervenor v. Grosso, 53 I.D. 115, 125-26 (1930). 4/ In Hayes v. Alaska Juneau Forest Industries, 748 P.2d 332, 335 (Alaska 1988), the court held: Abandonment of tailings is one way that tailings become real estate, but it is not the only way. When tailings are deposited for the purpose of disposal, as distinct from being stockpiled for future use, they become real estate even though they are not abandoned. Further, when tailings are used as real estate they become real estate. t t + + 3/ In Smith v. E1 Paso Gold Mines. Inc., 720 P. 2d at 610, the court held: "Mineral-bearing ore, however, removed from the earth and dumped on the surface occupies an intermediate status. Usually, the ore must still be extensively worked--transported to a mill and reduced--to yield it valuable mineral component. For this reason, ore dumps are often the subject of mining leases. The implication here is that only so much of the ore as is removed and processed becomes personalty. Therefore, such ore is most logically regarded as realty appurtenant to the land on which it is dumped . unless the miner and the owner of the land agree otherwise." In Forest of Dean Ore Co. v. United States, 64 F. Supp. 585 (Ct. C1. 1946), the court held that waste piles of crushed rock on land condemned by the United States were personalty and not included in the condemnation action against the realty. On the other hand, in a more recent case the court held that tailings accumulated from processing gold ore from the Cripple Creek mines over a period of 1908 through 1949 were a component of the real property upon which they were situated. Rerr v. Australia Pacific Resources. Ltd., 841 P. 2d 401, 403 (Colo. App. 1992). See also 6 Am. L. of Mining 5 205.07[3) (2 ed. 1984).