Laserfiche WebLink
<br />of certiorari seeking review of an award of temporary disability <br />benefits entered by the Arizona Industrial Commission. Castillo <br />alleged that he was permanently disabled and, thereforee, entitled <br />to permanent disability benefits. Eventually, the court remanded <br />the matter to the Commission for additional administrative <br />proceedings. During the interim of Castillo's filing for judicial <br />review and the court's remand, both Castillo and the Commission <br />proceeded with processing other aspects of Castillo's workman's <br />compensation claim. Most importantly, the Commission issued a <br />notice terminating Castillo's temporary medical and compensation <br />benefits, which Castillo contested in a hearing before the <br />Commission. When the Commission order was affirmed Castillo filed <br />a second writ of certiorari seeking review of the second order. <br />This writ questioned the lawfulness of the Commission's order <br />terminating Castillo's benefits. <br />The Arizona Court of appeals held that the Industrial <br />Commission retained jurisdiction to terminate benefits <br />notwithstanding the original writ of certiorari reasoning that <br />since: <br />... it is readily apparent that none of these <br />proceedings remotely involved or purported to <br />affect in any way the prior determination of <br />petitioner's average monthly wage. The <br />subsequent proceedings involved questions <br />concerning petitioner's physical condition, his <br />disability and consequent entitlement tc <br />medical benefits, and to temporary and <br />permanent compensation. A delay in the <br />determination of these matters was not <br />necessary to protect the jurisdiction of this <br />Court in the pending review of the prior <br />average monthly wage determination, nor would <br />such Commission proceedings, in the language <br />of the Arizona Supreme Court as set forth in <br />Whitfield, suara, tend to defeat or usurp the <br />jurisdiction of this Court to the extent that <br />any subsequent decision which we might have <br />rendered would be nugatory. We therefore must <br />conclude that the Commission retained <br />jurisdiction over the proceedings here <br />involved. <br />Because the factual circumstances of Castillo are so <br />similar to the amendment proposed by Battle Mountain, the reasoning <br />quoted above should be adopted. <br />C. Application Of The General Rule And Its <br />Exceptions To The Proposed Amendment Of Battle <br />Mountain's Permit. <br />13 <br />