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is an erdsting legal controversy that can be effectively resolved and not a mere possibility of a <br />future legal dispute." Dill v. Board of Ca. Com'rs. of Lincoln County. 928 P.2d 809, 815 (Colo. <br />App. 1996) (emphasis supplied). <br />The injury-in-fact requirement i s an express element of the statutory scheme pertinent to this <br />action. Although the Colorado 5utfaee Coal Mining Reclamation Act, Colo. Rev. Star. §§ 34-33- <br />101 to 34-33-137 ("the Coal Act") is silent on the issue of who may request judicial review, that <br />statute specifies standing requirements for seeking administrative review of the modification, <br />vacation, or termination of DMG enforcement action. Colo. Rev. Star. § 34-33-124(1)(a). These <br />same requirements implicitly govern standing to pursue judicial review under Colo. Rev. Star. § 34- <br />33-125 because the Colorado Legislature certainly did not intend to afford theright of judicial review <br />to persons whom it barred from requesting administrative review. To construe the Coai Act <br />otherwise would subvert the administrative review process that the Colorado Legislature carefully <br />crafted for review of DMG decisions to modify, vacate, or terminate enforcement action, leaving <br />courts to review such decisions de novo at the instance of persons, like Basin, who have neither <br />claimed nor shown a teal interest in the outcome. <br />It is important to note that the Coal Act's administrative review section contains different <br />administrative standing provisions for (1) proceedings that challenge the issuance of enforcement <br />action and (2) proceedings that object to the "modification, vacation, or termination" of <br />enforcement action. On the one hand. Colo. Rev. Star. § 34-33-124(1)(a) allows either the <br />"operator" to whom DMG issues enforcement action or any "person having an interest which is or <br />may be adversely affected" to request administrative review of the issuance of enforcement action. <br />In contrast, the same statute allows only a "person having an interest which is or tray be adversely <br />-5- <br />!IS-d 8l0/B00'd OE9-1 B55E99BEOE S3~tl00s3a 1tl8f11tlN 100-Y~oBd Ef~df 100b-E2-911tl <br />