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<br />653 N.E.2d 89 <br />(Cite as: 653 N.E.2d 89, *91) <br />Standard of Review <br />In reviewing a ruling on a motion for summary <br />judgment, this court applies the same standard <br />applied by the trial court. Walling v. Appel Service <br />Co. (1994), Ind.App., 641 N.E.2d 647, 6489; <br />Miller v. Monsanto (1993), ind.App., 626 N.E.2d <br />538, 541. Summary judgment is appropriate only if <br />"the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is <br />no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the <br />moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of <br />law." Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). We resolve any doubt <br />as [o a fact, or an inference [o be drawn therefrom, in <br />favor of the party opposing stunmary judgment. <br />[FN3] Miller, 626 N.E.2d at 54I. <br />FN3. The trial coon rntered extensive findings with <br />its order granting summary judgment for both Terra <br />and Kraft. While we are not bound by [he trial <br />court's fmdings, a trial court's explanation of its <br />reasons for entering summary judgment is <br />helpful on review. Miller, 626 N.E.2d at 541 <br />n. 2. <br />The purpose of summary judgment is to terminate <br />litigation about which there can be no factual dispute <br />and which can be determined as a matter of law. <br />Beradi v. Hardware Wholesalers, /nc. (1993), <br />Ind.App., 625 N.E.2d 1259, 1261, trans. denied. <br />Even though there may be conflicting facts and <br />inferences regarding certain elements of the claim, we <br />are only concerned with the diapositive or essential <br />facts, and inferences to be drawn therefrom Citizens <br />Nat. Bank v. Indianapolis Auto Auction (1992), <br />[nd.App., 592 N.E.2d 1256, 1257. <br />Measure of Damages <br />[1][2] in this case of first impression in Indiana, we <br />are asked to consider the proper measure of damages <br />for injury to land contaminated by PCBs. Under <br />Indiana law, the measure of damages in a case of <br />injury to real property depends fast upon a <br />determination of whether the injury is "permanent" or <br />"temporary." City ojAnderson v. Balling Concrete <br />Corp. (1980), Ind.App., 411 N.E.2d 728, 732, trans. <br />denied (citing General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. <br />LaSalle Realty Corp. (1966), 141 Ind.App. 247, 265, <br />218 N.E.2d 141, 150, trans. denied ). Permanent <br />injury to unimproved land occurs where "the cost of <br />restoration exceeds the market value ... prior to <br />injury." General Outdoor Advertising, 141 Ind.App. <br />at 267, 218 N.E.2d at I51. If the injury is <br />permanent, the measure of *92 damages is limited to <br />Page 3 <br />the difference between the fair market value of the <br />property before and after the injury, based on the <br />rationale that "economic waste" results when <br />restoration costs exceed the economic benefit. See <br />Balling, 411 N.E.2d at 734. For a temporary injury <br />the proper measure of damages is the cost of <br />restoration. /d. <br />It is undisputed that the cost to remediate Terra Site <br />far exceeded the value of the land itself Applying <br />the common law distinction between permanent and <br />temporary damage to these facts, the damage to Terra <br />Site would be considered pemtanent and the measure <br />of damages would be the difference between the <br />value of the property before and after the <br />remediation. That is the measure of damages <br />advocated by Terra on appeal. <br />Kraft maintains that because it has remediated Terra <br />Site at its expense, "Terra is entitled only to what it <br />has already received" and "its damage claims aze <br />moot." Brief of Appellees at 11. In other words, <br />Kraft azgues and the trial court determined that <br />remediation repaired Terra Site and, thus, that the <br />PCB contamination was temporary damage. The <br />court agreed with Kraft that Terra could not "seek to <br />recover damages allowed for permanent injury and <br />also to keep the rewards allowed under temporary <br />injury that have aready been performed." Record at <br />377. <br />The trial court's judgment was based on its <br />determination that "[u]nder recent case law and <br />through statements of the EPA and Indiana <br />legislature, PCB contamination has been treated as a <br />temporary injury despite the high cost of repair." <br />Record at 376. The court relied on the federal <br />district court decision in /n re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB <br />Litigation (E.D.Pa.1992), 811 F.Supp. 1071, and on <br />Indiana statutes and regulations, and reasoned that <br />those audtoriries were "contrary to the common law <br />policy of avoiding repair at costs which greatly <br />exceed the value of the land." Record at 376-77; see <br />IND. CODE § 13-7-8.5-5.5; IND. ADMIN. CODE <br />tit. 329, r. 2-6~. The trial court concluded that "the <br />current policy of the State of Indiana as well as the <br />United States ... preempt[s] the common law doctrine <br />for assessing the appropriate damages to real property <br />and requves PCB contamination to be considered a <br />temporary injury." Record a[ 377. <br />We agree with the trial court that in light of the often <br />exorbitant costs of remediation, the traditional <br />common law economic waste analysis is inadequate <br />Copt. ~ West 2001 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works <br />