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Reinstating the July 25, 2005 DMO Determination is consistent with the statute, regulations, and <br />the MLRB's own statements in the Statement of Basis Specific Statutory Authority and Purpose <br />for the regulations adopted to implement Senate Bi1193-247 where the legislature created DMO <br />status. For instance, the Statement recognizes that DMO status is proper where an "operation has <br />the potential to create or aggravate acidic or toxic drainages from naturally occurring geologic <br />materials mined or disturbed in their operation ... because there are. contaminant mobility <br />pathways available (such as ground or surface waters) that could lead to adverse impacts to <br />htunan health, property or the environment." Statement at 31 (referencing HRMM Rule <br />7)(emphasis added). <br />Again, the test for a DMO is only whether the operation has exposed or disturbed toxic materials <br />that could adversely affect human health, property, or the environment. The DMO determination <br />is a much broader and lower threshold than the narrow and elevated standazd used in the Mazch 6 <br />review and March 9 non-DMO determination that was based on whether proof exists that the <br />ground or surface water quality standards will be violated. <br />The March, 2006 reversal does not contravene or even question the sound basis of the original <br />finding -that the ore on site contains toxic-forming materials. Instead, as set forth more fully <br />above, the new finding was based solely on groundwater modeling of carbonates and ignores the <br />serious questions of the uranium sulfites. Cotter's flawed models seek only to show that surface <br />contaminants will not reach surface water bodies or groundwater in quantities sufficient to <br />violate surface or groundwater quality standards. As demonstrated, however, the proper test is <br />whether the toxic-forming materials could have an adverse impact, not whether they will violate <br />water quality standazds. <br />In addition, no analysis has been provided regazding DMO status being triggered by the <br />hydrological impacts of dewatering the ore bearirig layer. Also, the mine file indicates the <br />presence of intermittent streams and surface water expressions located at the site which require <br />erosion and flow control for these same toxic-producing materials. <br />There is no analysis in the file regarding such important matters as radiological and other hazazds <br />posed by the uranium ore whether exposure occurs on site or off site. At a minimum, in order to <br />qualify as exempt from DMO status, the Boazd and Office must assess the potential for adverse <br />impacts resulting from these aspects of the SM-1 S Mine. <br />In sum, the DRMS improperly granted anon-DMO finding under the exemption standards where <br />DRMS should have instead upheld the DMO determination and required the operator to file an <br />application for DMO exemption for formal review and consideration by the MLRB, the <br />interested public, and the federal agencies with responsibility for these federal public lands. <br />As a practical matter, the present case involves a situation where the Division had correctly <br />identified that the SM-18 Mine involves the toxic and acid-forming materials that trigger a DMO <br />determination, but after persistent lobbying from Cotter and its contractors, the Division <br />mistakenly granted a DMO exemption. The Division's July 2005 factual determination <br />