1979-06-06_ENFORCEMENT - M1978352 (13)

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date of the order pursuant to C .R.S . 24-4-106 (5) , (transcript page 35) and in the alternative requested an informal postpone- ment or deferral of final agency action (transcript page 36) . All such requests of Plaintiff ' s counsel were denied (transcript page 38) . Plaintiff could have done no more. It was not entitled to request a more extensive hearing at the meeting, as such request for hearings must be "timely filed with the Board not more than twenty (20) days after the date of last publication of notice, pursuant to Section 34-32-112 (10) . " C.R.S. 34-32-114 . Plaintiff was precluded from requesting a hearing at the March 1 meeting as the time for such request had been tolled on or about February 21st. (See Defendant ?demo, page 5 - paragraph 2) . Even if Plaintiff was entitled to request a •hearing or reconsideration at that time however , that would not be a bar to prior judicial review. C. R.S . 24-4-106 (2) . Further, the Board itself could have determined that good cause existed and made provisions for a hearing, C.R.S. 34-32-114, 115 (1) , which it failed to do. Instead, the Board elected to proceed with final agency action and approved the application in question. Plaintiff is entitled to judicial review pursuant to C.R. S. 24-4-106 , and in light of the facts above it clearly had exhausted it' s administrative remedies. There is no review process with the Board which Plaintiff could have resorted to after the meeting. If Defendant is claiming that Plaintiff was obligated to have requested a hearing at the initial notice stage, prior to the hearing , in order to ever preserve it' s right to judicial review, the absurdity of Defendant' s position becomes apparent. First, Plaintiff never received proper or timely notice, and thus it was not in a position to make a hearing request. (Goldman Affidavit supra p?s.11-18)But even if some sort of notice is found, why and -7-