1979-06-06_ENFORCEMENT - M1978352 (13)

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Stemwedel was the attorney for the Trust, as it was not in fact conveyed to the Trust and such knowledge of notice by an attorney will not be imputed to a client if the evidence is to the contrary. Knox vs . Knox, Unpub'd Colo. App.517 P. 2d 1350 (1973) . The Affidavits demonstrate that there was no evidence that the Trust itself in fact had adequate notice, and there was no evidence before the Board to this effect, though it made a finding to the contrary. Such a finding is clearly erroneous and cannot be sustained by the court, and especially so in light of the fact that Stemwedel was not even retained by the Trust, and therefore certainly any notice that he might have had cannot be imputed to the Trust. In short , an unauthorized letter of objection sent two weeks prior to the hearing cannot be manipulated into a waiver of Defendant ' s notice rights as provided by statute and federal and state constitutions. Chester Goldman' s status also provides no excuse for the Defendant' s failure to notice. Statutory notice to Brush Creek is not statutory or actual notice to Eagle Trust, absent substantial proof to the contrary. To prove such a proposition, all the following elements must be demonstrated: (1) statutory notice to Brush Creek resulted in actual notice to Brush Creek; (2) actual notice to Brush Creek resulted in actual notice to Chester Goldman; (3) actual notice to Chester Goldman as to Brush Creek ' s interest in the application resulted in actual notice to Chester Goldman of Eagle Trust' s interest in the application, i .e. was Goldman given reason to believe that Eagle Trust was effected by the application of which Brush Creek was notified; was Mr. Goldman made aware that Eacle Trust as o:ell was an adjacent effected landoc•:ner, absent direct notice to that effect (said notice merely to be inferred by formal notice to Brush Creek ) and (4) actual notice by Chester Goldman -17-