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case to the Board, Dixon filed a motion that the case be sent back <br /> to the hearing officer for the purpose of allowing him to. testify. <br /> The refusal of the Board so to do is the basis of Dixon 's final <br /> procedural attack. We conclude that Dixon 's decision not to testify <br /> at the tLme of the proceedings before the hearing officer was a <br /> tactical one, made with the advice of counsel, and accordingly, <br /> simply because that tactic proved unavailing, it was not an abuse <br /> of the =--ard 's discretion to refuse to give him a second opportunity. <br /> Finally, because there was no proof that his actions <br /> resulted in injury to patients, and because there was no evidence <br /> from which it might be inferred that he is incompetent to practice <br /> optometry, Dixon asserts that the penalty of revocation of his <br /> license is so excessive as to require reversal. We do not agree. <br /> Dixon permitted two unlicensed employees to practice <br /> optometry. They examined patient 's eyes, filled out examination <br /> and diagnosis forms, and prescribed corrective lenses. Dixon <br /> furnished blank signed prescription forms to them. These acts are <br /> clearly violative of § 12-40-102, C.R.S. 1973. The findings of the <br /> hearing officer that these acts were willful and deliberate is <br /> supported by substantial evidence and must therefore be affirmed. <br /> Section 24-4-106 (7) , C.R.S . 1973, Hickam v. Colorado Real Estate <br /> Commission, 36 Colo. App. 76, 534 P.2d 1220 (1975) . <br /> If the concept of licensing practitioners dealing with <br /> public health is to have any vitality and purpose beyond providing <br /> a certificate suitable for framing, it is unreasonable to require _ <br /> proof of injury to a patient before approving revocation of a license. <br /> Here, putatively unqualified employees were allowed to practice the <br /> profession of optometry. Their patients were entitled to rely on <br /> the assumption that the individuals were licensed by the state and <br /> therefore competent. As stated in Hickam v. Colorado Real Estate <br />