1977-04-07_ENFORCEMENT - M1978352

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case to the Board, Dixon filed a motion that the case be sent back to the hearing officer for the purpose of allowing him to. testify. The refusal of the Board so to do is the basis of Dixon 's final procedural attack. We conclude that Dixon 's decision not to testify at the tLme of the proceedings before the hearing officer was a tactical one, made with the advice of counsel, and accordingly, simply because that tactic proved unavailing, it was not an abuse of the =--ard 's discretion to refuse to give him a second opportunity. Finally, because there was no proof that his actions resulted in injury to patients, and because there was no evidence from which it might be inferred that he is incompetent to practice optometry, Dixon asserts that the penalty of revocation of his license is so excessive as to require reversal. We do not agree. Dixon permitted two unlicensed employees to practice optometry. They examined patient 's eyes, filled out examination and diagnosis forms, and prescribed corrective lenses. Dixon furnished blank signed prescription forms to them. These acts are clearly violative of § 12-40-102, C.R.S. 1973. The findings of the hearing officer that these acts were willful and deliberate is supported by substantial evidence and must therefore be affirmed. Section 24-4-106 (7) , C.R.S . 1973, Hickam v. Colorado Real Estate Commission, 36 Colo. App. 76, 534 P.2d 1220 (1975) . If the concept of licensing practitioners dealing with public health is to have any vitality and purpose beyond providing a certificate suitable for framing, it is unreasonable to require _ proof of injury to a patient before approving revocation of a license. Here, putatively unqualified employees were allowed to practice the profession of optometry. Their patients were entitled to rely on the assumption that the individuals were licensed by the state and therefore competent. As stated in Hickam v. Colorado Real Estate