1977-04-07_ENFORCEMENT - M1978352

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. i Dixon asserts that the proceedings ware fatally defective in several respects . With regard to his first contention, that the Board failed to comply with notice requirements, we observe that these proceedings are controlled by the State Administrative Procedure Act (A.P.A.) , § 24-4-101 et seq., C.R.S. 1973. See qenerallv Silverstein & Ruland, Preparation of The Appeal From an Administra- tive De=ision, The Colorado Lawyer, P. 2305 (December 1975) . The pertinent portion of the A.P.A. is § 24-4-104 (3) , C.R.S. 1973, which provides : "No revocation of a license by any agency shall be lawful unless, before institution of agency proceedings therefor, the agency has given the licensee notice in writing of facts or conduct that may warrant such action, afforded the licensee opportunity to submit written data, views, and argu- ients with respect to such facts or conduct, and, except in cases of deliberate and willful violation, given the licensee a reasonable opportunity to comply with all lawful requirements." Dixon argues that he was entitled to two notices, one that proceedings against him had been initiated, as well as a separate notice of the hearing itself. We conclude that neither due process considerations nor the statute require double notice. Dixon was a-fforded both notice and an opportunity to be heard. The notice of hearing explicitly detailed the charges which had been made against him and apprised him of his right to present evidenca in his own behalf. A full hearing was had at the administra- tive level. Due process requires no more. Bell V. Burson, 402 U.S . 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971) ., The statutory mandates of § 24-4-104 (3) , C.R.S . 1973, also were complied with. The notice of hearing served the dual purpose of informing Dixon of the hearing date and giving him written notice of the facts or conduct warranting the Board 's action, as well as -3-