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t 6 <br />mine floor or entered the NE Tailgate sump had substantially increased levels of total suspended <br />solids. To reduce the volumes of water that had to be pumped outside and treated in the sediment <br />ponds, MCC submitted a request to the Colorado Water Quality Control Division to amend its <br />' CDPS permit to allow direct discharge ofthe fault water to the MB-1 spillway. This amendment <br />was approved and MCC completed the installation of a direct discharge line from the B East <br />Mains fault inflow in a designated "clean water" pipeline to outside the mine. <br />' 21) The Division's assumption was correct. As discussed above and on page 2 of Dr. Mayo's <br />' letter, the fault inflows were about 84° F and 89° F from the B East Mains and 14 SE Headgate <br />faults, respectively. The temperature of the water in the sealed sump has been measured at 74° F. <br />' 22) See the attached meeting summaries, as well as the above discussions and responses. Dan <br />Meadors, MCC's former Operation Manager and Scott Jones, MCC's Production Superintendent <br />inspected the Bear Mine in late 1995 to determine if Bear was encountering the same mining <br />t conditions (poor roof and water) north of Lone Pine Gulch as the West Elk Mine had to the <br />south. These men recalled that Dan Bear revealed that the west expansion of Third West into a <br />small coal lease from MCC had to be halted due to poor mining conditions (including water), even <br />' before Bear entered this lease. Phil Schmidt met with the Bears in the Spring of 1996 to provide <br />a precautionary notification that MCC planned to sump large quantities of water up-dip of their <br />operation. Gary Witt of Wright Water Engineers, Christine Johnston and I met with Basil Bear in <br />November 1996 to review Bear's mine map and to discuss their inflow experiences. Our plan to <br />inspect the mine had to be canceled, as the Bears decided that day to close and seal the Beaz No. <br />3 Mine due to a significant roof fall inby their ventilation fan. (Neither of the two inflows from <br />' the seals could have been inspected anyway, as Bear had sealed their main entries (and access to <br />the two seals) in August 1996. No further inflows had since been seen by Bear). <br />' 23) Although Bear may not have encountered thermal waters in the Bear Mine, neither Bear nor <br />MCC had access to, nor knowledge of such conditions or changes that may have occurred in the <br />sealed Edwards Mine. As discussed above, MCC has found evidence of continued spontaneous <br />' combustion in the C-seam of the Bear Mine. MSHA inspectors interviewed by MCC, stated that <br />Bear had historic carbon monoxide problems with their mine ventilation. Carbon monoxide, a <br />product of coal combustion, would occasionally move through (or "in-gas") from behind the C- <br />seam seals in the Bear Mine that bracketed the entire length of their main entries from the portals <br />to the B seam access slopes. MCC believes that spontaneous combustion is a very plausible and <br />' the most likely source of heat for the Edwards Mine discharge. <br />' MCC believes that the above information, along with discussions during the three previous <br />meetings with the Division (per the attached summaries and exhibits), the December 18, 1997 <br />meeting and the subsequent (January 1998) report by Wright Water Engineers entitled, <br />' "Evaluation of Bear No. 3 Landslide", the January 21, 1998 meeting and the January 20, 1998 <br />report by Mayo and Associates entitled, "Comparison of West Elk Mine Discharge Water with <br />Discharge Water from the Edwards Mine Portal, Somerset, CO", and the subsequent supplement <br />' dated February 20, 1998, provides the necessary information and documentation to refute the <br />allegations ofNOV No. CV-97-022. Thus, MCC respectfully requests that this NOV be vacated. <br />