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has a reasonable basis in law and is warranted by the record." An agency is also accorded <br />deference if the statute is subject to several different reasonable interpretations, rendering it <br />ambiguous, and the issues are within the agency's expertise. Huddleston v. Grand County Bd. of <br />Equalization, 913 P.2d 15 (Colo. 1996). If a statute is ambiguous, courts will determine proper <br />construction by, among other things "examining the ...possible consequences of various <br />constructions." Lobato v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 105 Pad 220, 223-224 (Colo. 2005). <br />The statute at issue, C.R.S. § 34-32.5-110(Sxa), states in part: <br />Any operator conducting an operation under a permit issued under this <br />section who has held the permit for two consecutive years or more and <br />who subsequently desires to expand it to a size in excess of the limitation <br />set forth in subsection (1) of this section may request the conversion of the <br />permit by filing an application for a permit pursuant to subsection (1) of <br />this section or section 34-32.5-112.. . <br />Rule 1.11.2(1) corresponds with section 110, and it explains that "[e]xcept for permit <br />conversions under Subparagraph 1.11.1(2), the on final Permittee cannot convert a Permit unless <br />the permit has been in existence for two consecutive yeazs." (Emphasis added). Pursuant to <br />section 108, the Board had the authority to promulgate this regulation. The Boazd reasonably <br />interpreted the Act to require the existence of a permit for two years prior to allowing conversion <br />applications. See Miller. <br />In addition, despite the Objectors' argument to the contrary, the wording of C.R.S. § 34- <br />32.5-110(5)(a) is ambiguous. The ambiguity lies in the fact that (5)(a) informs the reader that he <br />or she may file the conversion application pursuant to the provisions of either section 34-32.5- <br />110(1) or 34-32.5-112. Significantly, the procedures for applying fora 110 permit do not require <br />a two year waiting period, and the reader is explicitly given the option of using the 110 <br />procedures for a conversion application. However, the only option to convert a 110 permit under <br />the Act is to convert it to a 112; one cannot convert a 110 to a 110. Therefore, this option leads <br />to a conflict within the statute, rendering it ambiguous, and therefore, under Huddleston, sUDra, <br />the Boazd's interpretation controls: the permit itself must have been in existence for at least two <br />years before the permittee may apply for a conversion. Here, because the permit has been in <br />existence for 28 years, the Division did not err when it considered King Mountain's conversion <br />application, and therefore, the Objectors' Motion should be denied. <br />III. Even if the Objectors' interpretation of C.R.S. § 34-32.5-110(5) is <br />accepted, the issue is now moot as Kine Mountain has held the Hermit for <br />over two veazs. <br />Even if the Objectors' asserted interpretation that the pennittee needed to wait two full <br />years before seeking a conversion is accepted, the issue is now moot in that more than two years <br />have passed, and any policy objectives implicated by waiting two years have been accomplished. <br />A case is moot when a party seeks a legal opinion or ruling when there is no underlying <br />controversy. Reserve Life fns. Co. v. Frankfather, 123 Colo. 77, 78 225 P.2d 1035, 1036 (Colo. <br />l <br />