2006-12-06_REVISION - M1978314 (2)

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has a reasonable basis in law and is warranted by the record." An agency is also accorded deference if the statute is subject to several different reasonable interpretations, rendering it ambiguous, and the issues aze within the agency's expertise. Huddleston v. Grand Countv Bd. of Equalization, 913 P.2d 1 S (Colo. 1996). If a statute is ambiguous, courts will determine proper construction by, among other things "examining the ...possible consequences of various constructions." Lobato v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 105 P.3d 220, 223-224 (Colo. 2005). The statute at issue, C.R.S. § 34-32.5-110(5}(a), states in part: Any operator conducting an operation under a permit issued under this section who has held the permit for two consecutive yeazs or more and who subsequently desires to expand it to a size in excess of the limitation set forth in subsection (1) of this section may request the conversion of the permit by filing an application for a permit pursuant to subsection (1) of this section or section 34-32.5-112.. . Rule 1.11.2(1) corresponds with section 110, and it explains that "[e]xcept for permit conversions under Subpazagraph 1.11.1(2), the prig; nal Permittee cannot convect a Permit unless the permit has been in existence for two consecutive yeazs." (Emphasis added}. Pursuant to section 108, the Board had the authority to promulgate this regulation. The Board reasonably interpreted the Act to require the existence of a permit for two yeazs prior to allowing conversion applications. See Miller. In addition, despite the Objectors' argument to the contrary, the wording of C.R.S. § 34- 32.5-110(5)(a) is ambiguous. The ambiguity lies in the fact that (5)(a) informs the reader that he or she may file the conversion application pursuant to the provisions of either section 34-32.5- 110(1) or 34-32.5-I 12. Significantly, the procedures for applying fora 110 permit do not require a two year waiting period, and the reader is explicitly given the option of using the 110 procedures for a conversion application. However, the only option to convert a 110 permit under the Act is to convert it to a 112; one cannot convert a 110 to a 110. Therefore, this option leads to a conflict within the statute, rendering it ambiguous, and therefore, under Huddleston, supra, the Board's interpretation controls: the permit itself must have been in existence for at least two years before the permittee may apply for a conversion. Here, because the permit has been in existence for 28 years, the Division did not err when it considered King Mountain's conversion application, and therefore, the Objectors' Motion should be denied. IIT. Even ifthe Objectors' interpretation of C.R.S. ~ 34-32.5-110(SZis accepted, the issue is now moot as King Mountain has held the~ermit for over two years. Even if the Objectors' asserted interpretation that the permittee needed to wait two full years before seeking a conversion is accepted, the issue is now moot in that more than two years have passed, and any policy objectives implicated by waiting two yeazs have been accomplished. A case is moot when a party seeks a legal opinion or ruling when there is no underlying controversy. Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Frankfather, 123 Colo. 77, 78 225 P.2d 1035, 1036 (Colo. ,` 4