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(i1 Under the State program, the possible violation <br />does not exist; <br />(ii) the State regulatory authority requires a <br />reasonable and specified additional time to determine <br />whether a violation of the State program does exist; <br />(iii) the State regulatory authority lacks jurisdiction <br />under the State program over the possible violation or <br />operation; <br />(iv) the State regulatory authority is precluded by an <br />administrative or judicial order from an administrative <br />body or court of competent jurisdiction from acting on <br />the possible violation, where that order is based on <br />the violation not existing or where the temporary <br />relief standards of section 525(c) or 525 (c) of the Act <br />have been met; or <br />(v) with regard to abandoned sites as defined in Sec. <br />840.11 (g) of this chapter, the State regulatory <br />authority is diligently pursuing or has exhausted all <br />appropriate enforcement provisions of the State <br />program. <br />The key to understanding Director Seibel's decision in this case <br />is the first good Cause definition, above. If Colorado has shown <br />that no violation exists, then the State has shown good cause and <br />Federal enforcement jurisdiction does not arise. <br />In determining whether a state's action oz showing of good <br />cause is an appropriate response to a TDN, OSM employs an <br />"arbitrary and capricious" standard. See 30 C.F.R. <br />§ 842.11(b)(1)(ii)(B)(2). This standard provides that the <br />state's decision will be upheld unless it is "arbitrary, <br />capricious, or an abuse of discretion." Id. This standard is <br />the same one that the IBLA and the.Federal courts apply in <br />various appeals of administrative actions. See Lois J. <br />Armstrong, 130 IBLA 228, 232 (August 5, 1994). The arbitrary and <br />18 <br />