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i 214 Morrison v, Socolofsky [43 Colo. App. [2] It was, therefore, proper for the court to consider maps prepared by the Colorado Geological Survey and the results of test hole drilling un- dertaken in 1475 on plaintiffs' property. This evidence showed gravel un- derlying the topsoil of the entire parcel of land such that removal would destroy the surface. It also was proper to consider testimony of a gcologisl- consultant in the gravel industry and of agricultiral lenders and landown- ers on the common meaning of the term "mineral" at the time of the res- ervation. On the basis of undisputed testimony, the trial court correctly ruled that at the time of defendants' reservation, the term "mineral" did not, as a matter of law, include gravel. See generally Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 843. Defendants also contend that the court disregarded the intent of the parties at the time of the reservation. We do not agree. Defendants properly contend that the trial court would have a duty to incorporate into the deed and reservation virtually any substance which the parties intended by use of the term "mineral." That would be so even if the substance did not meet any of the criteria set out in Farrell v. Sayre, supra. However, under the evidence presented, the trial court properly determined that the gravel underlying the surface was not within the contemplation of the parties when the "mineral" resen:uion was written. In its extensive findings, the trial court determined that Baker pur- chased the parcel for (arming, that defendants knew of his purpose, and that common gravel mining techniques necessitate use of the topsoil or fine dirt, especially where the gravel is extracted for paving purposes. Though in Farre/! v. Sayre, supra, the sand and gravel constituted the entire surface of the land, we find no distinction which would dictate a dif- ferent result here, where the gravel underlies the topsoil of the entire pro- perty. Defendants' construction of the reservation could result in the des- truction of the land surface and strip away its agricultural usefulness. Cf. Smith v. Moore, 172 Colo. 440, 474 P.2d 794 (1970). (Reservation of right to use of surface as necessary for mining not of sufficient c{arity to justify strip mining.) Under the facts of this case, the court correctly determined that gravel was not reserved in defendants' deed. Therefore, we affirm the judgment. JUDGE PIERCE and JUDGE SMITH concur. ,~.. .~, AI T~ Fr B~ 1'r A~ an n, c, h, °~~ ~ ~~~~ ~~~~~~ t ~ ~~~ 'I"~° lit ~ ~~i~~~!''~~ ~ "N~I~1~+ ~ ii~ll' H ~i1 ~ IIR[~~IAE~ ~ ~ ,~~, • ~ ~, ~ ~i ~ ~ ~~I^~~ I