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should not be allowed to testify. Additionally, the testimony of Mr. Wisely should be stricken to the extent it deals with mineral rights on the Applicant's property. 2a. The question of the ownership of any potential mineral rights on Allen's property was first raised after the close of the comment period on March 23, 2005 and is, therefore, not timely. See Rule 1.7.1(2)(a). As untimely commentary to the administrative permit process, the Boazd'should not consider the issue of ownership in any minerals on Allen's property, and should disallow any testimony on those matters. 2b. Even if the ownership question was timely raised, i[ is beyond the jurisdiction of the Board, and cannot form the basis for denial of the application. As such, any testimony regazding ownership is irrelevant to the Board's consideration of Allen's permit application, and should be stricken. Neither the Rules nor the Land Reclamation Act for the Extraction of Construction Materials, C.R.S. § 34-32.5-101 et seq. ("the Act"), allow the Boazd or the Division to decide ownership disputes, or to deny a permit based upon an ownership dispute. See C.R.S. § 34-32.5-115(4) (setting forth the exclusive grounds upon which the Boazd may deny a permit). Moreover, as the Colorado Court of Appeals has held, the Mined Land Reclamation Act, C.R.S. § 13-34-32-101 et seq., which establishes the Boazd and delineates its duties and powers, does not "purport[] to grant the Reclamation Boazd jurisdiction to construe deeds or to determine ownership of mineral estates. Such legal matters lie exclusively within the province of the courts." O'Connor v. Rolfes, 899 P.2d 227, 229 (Colo. App. 1995). Thus, any testimony by Mr. O'Dell or Mr. Wisely regarding ownership of any potential mineral estate on Allen's property constitutes testimony on matters outside the Boazd's jurisdiction. As such, the testimony is irrelevant and should not be allowed. 2c. Additionally, as an attorney practicing law in Colorado who would opine on the ultimate legal conclusion to be reached in this case, Mr. O'Dell's testimony is improper. Where an attorney testifies as an expert witness, the Colorado courts have drawn a distinction between testimony explaining what the law is and testimony applying the law to come to an ultimate legal conclusion. See Grogan v. Tavlor, 877 P.2d 1374, 1384 (Colo. App. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Tavlor v. Grogan, 900 P.2d 60 (Colo. 1995). Where an attorney testifies before a district court as to the correct legal conclusion to be drawn in a given instance, the attorney has "improperly invaded the province of the trial court as the giver of law." Id. at 1384. Phrased more succinctly, "an expert testifying as to issues of law may not ...simply tell the jury what result to reach." People v. Lesslie, 939 P.2d 443, 450 (Colo. App. 1997). As one court explained when rejecting the testimony of an attorney in a quiet title action, "the fundamental problem with testimony containing a legal conclusion is that conveying the witness' unexpressed, and perhaps erroneous, legal standards to the jury amounts to a usurpation of the court's resppnsibility to determine the applicable law and to instruct.the jury as to that law." Create 21 Chuo, Inc. v. Southwest Sloges, Inc., 918 P.2d 1128, 1178 n.4 (Haw. App. 1996). Since Mr. O'Dell would purportedly offer a legal conclusion as to mineral ownership, his testimony would be improper and should not be allowed. WHEREFORE, the Applicant respectfully requests that the Boazd strike Chris O'Dell from the Objectors' witness list and disallow all testimony from Mr. O'Dell.