Laserfiche WebLink
clear and unambiguous on its face, then [a court] will apply the statute as written, [ <br />] because it may be presumed that the General Assembly meant what it clearly <br />said." In re Marriage of Chalat, 112 P.3d 47, 54 (Colo. 2005) (internal cites and <br />quotes omitted). <br />Deference is given to an agency's interpretation of its statute, but this court <br />is not bound by that interpretation, especially when the interpretation is not <br />uniform or consistent. Lobato v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 105 P.3d 220, <br />223 (Colo. 2005). Moreover, this court must defer to an agency's guidance, rules, <br />and determinations only if they are in accord with the constitutional and statutory <br />provisions they implement. Washington County Bd. of Equalization v. Petron <br />Development Co., 109 P.3d at 150. <br />In deternuning whether to grant a permit, the decision-making authority of <br />the MLRB is dictated by the Reclamation Act and specifically C.R.S. § 34-32.5- <br />115(4). Section 34-32.5-115(4), C.R.S., contains the only seven bases upon which <br />the MLRB may deny a permit, stating, "The board...shall not deny a permit except <br />on one or more the following grounds...." C.R.S. § 34-32.5-115(4). The following <br />two bases for denial are relevant here: <br />(a) The application is incomplete... <br />15 <br />