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<br />Federal Register /Vol. 66, No. 11 /Wednesday, January 17, 2001(Rules and Regulations 4552 <br />fallback. In addition, in response to <br />comments that we received, we have <br />included in the final rule a descriptive <br />definition of "incidental fallback." <br />As today's rule expressly provides <br />that it does not shift any burden in CWA <br />judicial or administrative proceedings, <br />we do not agree that the rule has the <br />effect of simply presuming jurisdiction, <br />as the burden to show that a regulable <br />discharge occurs has not been altered. <br />Further, because we do not use a <br />rebuttable presumption in today's final <br />rule, the legal standards under the <br />caselaw for judging the adequacy of an <br />agency's record to justify a rebuttable <br />presumption are not relevant to this <br />rule. We also do not agree that today's <br />rule results in a permit being required <br />in every circumstance in which the <br />activities listed occur. Today's rule <br />continues to expressly provide that <br />incidental fallback is not a regulable <br />discharge, and also provides for project- <br />specificconsideration of whether only <br />incidental fallback results from the <br />activities addressed by the rule. We <br />believe that the modified regulatory <br />language provides a measure of <br />regulatory certainty as to the types of <br />activities that are likely to result in a <br />regulable discharge, while preserving <br />necessary Flexibility to address the <br />specific circumstances of a given <br />project. <br />We also believe that allowing for <br />project-specific information that the <br />activity is conducted in a manner that <br />results in only incidental fallback is <br />indicative of that flexibility, rather than <br />undercutting the validity of our general <br />view. With respect to consistency with <br />legal precedent and the CWA, we have <br />addressed such issues elsewhere in the <br />preamble, primarily in sections II C and <br />III A. <br />Today's regulation is based on the <br />nature ofearth-moving equipment (i.e., <br />machines that move the earth). Contrary <br />to the assertion that no technical <br />analysis was provided, the preamble to <br />the proposed rule, as well as materials <br />in the rule's record, do provide <br />technical information supporting the <br />reasonableness of the final rule. We also <br />believe the rule is reasonable in that it <br />helps ensure that activities resulting in <br />discharges meant to be addressed by the <br />CWA are in fact regulated. Moreover, <br />the rule's explicit opportunity to <br />consider project-specific evidence to the <br />contrary, and express recognition that it <br />does not shik any burden in any <br />administrative or judicial proceeding <br />under the CWA, ensures that activities <br />outside our jurisdiction are not <br />regulated. <br />One commenter contended that <br />excavation activities result in <br />environmental benefits, providing an <br />example that the size of certain <br />unnamed drainages underwent a net <br />expansion as the result of excavation a[ <br />mine sites. Another comment asserted <br />that the presumption was not reasonable <br />because during the interval between the <br />court decision and the publication of <br />the proposed rule, the Corps, according <br />to the commenter, had implicitly or <br />explicitly acknowledged circumstances <br />where excavation activities could be <br />undertaken without a discharge <br />requiring a section 404 permit. <br />Whether or not one agrees that certain <br />excavation activities result in a net <br />expansion of waters or net benefit to the <br />aquatic environment does not beaz upon <br />the issue of whether such activities <br />produce regulable discharges. Many <br />restoration activities and other <br />environmentally beneficial efforts <br />necessitate discharges into waters of the <br />U.S., a number of which are provided <br />authorization under Nationwide General <br />Permits. <br />A number of commenters requested <br />clarification of, or objected to, the <br />rebuttal process due to vagueness. These <br />commenters sought further specifics as <br />to the type of information that could be <br />used to rebut the presumption and the <br />standard of proof. In addition, they <br />expressed concern that it would be <br />difficult or impractical to rebut the <br />presumption contained in the proposed <br />rule. These commenters were concerned <br />that the proposal placed an unfair <br />burden on the landowner by requiring <br />the applicant to prove a standardless <br />proposition or not rebut the <br />presumption and risk enforcement. <br />These commenters believed it would be <br />difficult to present a valid case because <br />the proposal did not establish a set of <br />clearly defined criteria for rebutting the <br />presumption of discharge; some said <br />that the rule seemed to require that a <br />party undertake the activity with its <br />inherent enforcement risks in order to <br />provide evidence to rebut the <br />presumption; others argued that the <br />description of a regulable discharge is so <br />broad that the presumption can not be <br />rebutted. Others expressed concern that <br />any effort to rebut the presumption <br />would be extremely ttme-consuming, <br />confusing, technically challenging and <br />cost prohibitive. Other commencers <br />expressed the view that the rule unfairly <br />placed the burden of determining <br />jurisdiction on the regulated <br />community, a burden that should be <br />borne by the government instead. <br />As noted in the proposed rule <br />preamble, the proposal expressed: <br />• • our expectation that, absent a <br />deinonsuation to the contrary, the activities <br />addressed in the proposed rule typically will <br />result in more than incidental fallback and <br />thus result in regulable redeposits of dredged <br />material. I[ would not, however, establish a <br />new formal process or new record keeping <br />requirements, and Section 404 permitting <br />and application requirements would <br />continue to apply only to regulable <br />discharges and not to incidental fallback. <br />65 FR 50113. <br />The proposal would not have required <br />project proponents or landowners to <br />"prove a negative" or shik the burden <br />of proof as to CWA jurisdiction from the <br />government to the regulated community <br />and the final rule clazifies our intent in <br />this regard. As we have discussed in <br />section II C of today's preamble, in light <br />of comments received, we have revised <br />the rule to make cleaz that it does not <br />shift the burden of showing that a <br />regulable dischazge has occurred under <br />the CWA, and also have included a <br />descriptive definition of non-regulable <br />incidental fallback in order to help <br />provide a standard against which to <br />judge regulable versus non-regulable <br />redeposits. As a result, we do not <br />believe the final rule somehow <br />establishes or requires atime- <br />consuming or expensive rebuttal <br />process. Instead, it provides clarification <br />to those who have unwittingly misread <br />the NMA case to preclude regulation of <br />all removal activities in waters of the <br />United States. issues related to the types <br />of relevant information we will consider <br />in determining if a regulable discharge <br />has occurred aze addressed in section II <br />C of today's preamble. <br />Other commenters felt the proposed <br />rule's presumption was unreasonable in <br />light of the exclusion provided for <br />"normal dredging operations." As in the <br />original August 25, 1993, Tulloch Rule, <br />several commenters suggested that all <br />discharges of dredged material should <br />be regulated, stating that it does not <br />seem reasonable or consistent to <br />exclude dischazges incidental to <br />"normal dredging operations" for <br />navigation, while regulating excavation <br />for non-navigation purposes. <br />In response we note that today's rule <br />does not modify in any respect the <br />provisions of [he 1993 rule related to <br />normal dredging operations, and we <br />have not reopened any of these <br />provisions in this rulemaking. The <br />rationale for the normal dredging <br />operation provisions was explained in <br />the August 25, 1993 rulemaking (58 FR <br />45025j15026), and interested readers <br />are referred to that discussion for further <br />details. <br />