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JUN-19-1999 12 03 F.OTHGERPEP. JOHrlSON3LYON5 s97 639 6262 P.cJ5 <br />": ~ • <br />Chemical shows below, the DMG also fails to correctly characterize the requirements of the <br />Rules, which do not authorize the DMG to establish standards after the application is approved. <br />If the DMG has an alternative rationale far ignoring the statute, that rationale has not been <br />disclosed. Perhaps the DMG takes the position that the statutory dif5culty is avoided entirely by <br />the simple expedient of granting the permit. Once a permit has been granted, it would be literally <br />true tfiat American Soda would have obtained a permit before engaging in mining operations. <br />however, this expedient would violate standards canons of statutory construction. At a <br />minimum, it would not be construing the statute as a whole, and giving consistent, harmonious, <br />and sensible effect to all of its parts. Avi('.o m Inc v .olorado Public Utilities ~mmigeion, <br />955 P.2d 1023 (Colo. 1998). <br />A grant-it-first-and-set-standards-after approach also presents practical difficulties that <br />argue against that interpretation. Taking the DMG approach literally, it appears that the DMG <br />will not be able to refuse permission to inject solution Honing fluids if the Monitoring Program ie <br />carried out, even if it later becomes apparent that the design of the Monitoring Program is flawed. <br />V the establishment of standards based on the Monitoring Program is indeed automatic, then the <br />DMG has surrendered its authority to set standards as required by the statute and Rules, in a <br />dubious exchange for the authority to negotiate a research program. There is no basis in the <br />statute or the Rules for such a position. <br />