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We are asked to decide, as a matter of first impression in <br /> Colorado, whether campaign contributions can disqualify elected <br /> officials from serving as decision-makers in quasi-judicial <br /> proceedings under the Due Process Clause. <br /> In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 884 (2009), <br /> the United States Supreme Court held that, "when a person with a <br /> personal stake in a particular case had a significant and <br /> disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by <br /> raising funds or directing the judge's election campaign when the <br /> case was pending or imminent," the Due Process Clause requires <br /> the judge's recusal. In so holding, the Supreme Court noted that <br /> the Due Process Clause provides only the outer limits for judicial <br /> disqualifications and that most disputes over disqualifications <br /> should be resolved by application of statutes, ordinances, or codes <br /> of conduct. Id. at 889-90. The Caperton Court emphasized that <br /> recusal was required in that case because the facts were "rare," <br /> "exceptional," and "extreme." Id. at 884, 887, 890. <br /> In this case, several of Loveland Ready-Mix Concrete, Inc.'s <br /> (Ready-Mix) stockholders contributed to the campaign committee to <br /> reelect incumbent Larimer County Commissioner Tom Donnelly in <br /> 1 <br />